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WRONGLY ACCUSED REDUX: HOW RACE 
CONTRIBUTES TO CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: THE INFORMANTS EXAMPLE 
 
Andrew E. Taslitz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an earlier article, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting 
the Innocent?,1 I answered that question with a qualified “yes.”2  My 
answer was qualified because the empirical data supporting my theory was 
limited, though far from non-existent.3  My argument was that subconscious 
racial biases lead decisionmakers at various key points in the processing of 
a criminal case to view racial minorities, especially African-Americans, as 
more dangerous and less credible than whites.4  Police therefore use more 
intense—and riskier—investigative techniques when having contact with 
black suspects.5  But those suspects are more likely than white ones to react 
to such pressure defensively.6  That reaction leads the officers to be still 
more suspicious of their subject, leading them in turn to still more 
 
*Welsh S. White Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, 2008-09, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law; Professor, Howard University School of Law; former Assistant District Attorney, 
Philadelphia, PA.; J.D., 1981, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1978, Queens 
College.  The author thanks the Southwestern Law Review and Professor Myrna Raeder for their 
invitation to participate in this symposium on innocence; his research assistants, Stacy Chaffin, 
Nicole Smith, and Adrienne Moran, for their excellent assistance; and Alexandra Natapoff for her 
feedback on an earlier draft of this article; and the Howard University School of Law for its 
support of this project. 
 1. Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused: Is Race a Factor in Convicting the Innocent?, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 121 (2006). 
 2. Id. at 121. 
 3. Id. at 123 (“In only one area has the science proceeded far enough to support some 
reasonably confident conclusions [about race and innocence]—though more work still needs to be 
done—and that is in the area of cross-racial misidentification.”). 
 4. Id. at 125-26 (summarizing theory). 
 5. Id. at 127. 
 6. Id. at 125, 127. 
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aggressive policing tactics.7  This escalating cycle of aggression continues 
until a mistaken eyewitness identification, false confession, or similar 
source of error results.8  Fact-finders, in turn, are more likely to conclude 
that such flawed evidence is in fact credible.9  In short, I explained, “racial 
features trigger an unconscious process of stereotyping and selective 
inattention,” a process rooted in racial stigma and a corresponding 
presumption of black criminality.10  This presumption is not simply that a 
black suspect committed a particular crime, but rather that black character is 
paradigmatically criminal and deceptive.11  So strong is this presumption 
that even black officers face substantial peer pressure to treat black suspects 
more harshly than white ones, generating flawed confirming evidence of 
black guilt.12 
My focus in the earlier piece was primarily on what happens after a 
black suspect has been arrested.13  Furthermore, I explored only intra-case 
feedback effects—how errors at one stage of a single criminal case can 
cause or amplify the effect of errors at a later stage.14  Additionally, my 
primary examples were drawn from eyewitness identifications and 
interrogations, though I promised that my approach had implications for 
other investigative techniques, particularly the use of informants.15  In this 
piece I hope to broaden my inquiry to fill these gaps in my nascent theory. 
More specifically, I want to examine here how race’s role, in affecting 
who enters the criminal justice system in the first place (the stop or arrest 
decision itself), magnifies the risk of racial disparities in mistaken 
convictions.  I also plan to explore inter-case feedback effects—how race’s 
heightening the risk of error in an individual case can cumulatively heighten 
the risk of error and racial disparities in its distribution in future cases.  But 
there is still another systemic feedback effect: the increased criminal 
victimization of racial minority group members who are never arrested or 
 
 7. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 125, 127. 
 8. See, e.g., id. at 131-32 (illustrating this process in the context of police interrogation).  
For a summary of the problems with error in eyewitness identifications and confessions, see JON 
B. GOULD, THE INNOCENCE COMMISSION: PREVENTING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND 
RESTORING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 77-78, 132-204 (2008) (analyzing sources of error 
leading to wrongful convictions). 
 9. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 131-33. 
 10. Id. at 125. 
 11. See id. at 126-27. 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 128 (noting that a black officer was “ostracized and often work[ed] 
dangerous assignments without backup” after he complained about the disparate treatment black 
suspects and victims typically received relative to whites). 
 13. Taslitz, supra note 1, at 125-26. 
 14. Id. at 131-33. 
 15. Id. at 125. 
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charged with a crime.  Finally, I want to keep the promise made in my 
earlier piece to illustrate the implications of these observations for police 
use of informants. 
Many of the general principles on which I will rely will be familiar, but 
their combined effect on an individual’s race raising the risk of error in 
convicting a suspect has, to my knowledge, never been explored.  After this 
Introduction, I explore in Part II, at a high level of generality, five raced 
effects that cumulatively raise this risk and are articulated as follows: the 
selection, blinders, ratchet, procedural justice, and bystander’s effects. 
The “selection effect” describes how race draws police attention away 
from white suspects toward black ones.16  The police then suffer from the 
“blinders effect,” closing their eyes to alternative theories about who 
committed the crime while searching for confirming evidence that, as 
everyone suspected, “the black guy did it.”17  The “ratchet effect” is a 
feedback effect in which ever-increasing focus on blacks as suspects causes 
ever-increasing arrests and convictions of blacks, thus further feeding 
police belief in black criminality as central to black character.18  These three 
effects combined mean that proportionately more blacks will enter the 
criminal justice system, facing aggressive and unreliable investigative 
techniques once there.  With ever-more blacks entering the system and 
facing riskier, error-enhancing police treatment than is true for whites, the 
absolute number and perhaps also the rate of blacks being falsely convicted 
will spiral upward.19 
But high rates of error and harsh treatment undermine black trust in the 
police, causing a “procedural justice effect.”20  A community’s decreased 
trust in police fairness leads that community’s members to reduce the 
frequency and depth of police-citizen cooperation.21  Moreover, reduced 
community aid in combating crime leads to its expansion.22  More black 
crime means more black arrests and more white fear of black criminals, 
prompting political pressure on the police to ramp up the intensity of 
 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 112-51. 
 18. See infra text accompanying notes 152-63. 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 152-65; see also DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL 
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 1-2 (2007) (summarizing data on black-white racial 
disparities in incarceration). 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 164-93.  For a survey on much of the leading literature 
on procedural justice effects, see Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in 
HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAW 65-92 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 
2001). 
 21. See TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC 
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 204-08 (2002). 
 22. See infra text accompanying notes 164-93. 
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investigative techniques and thus their error rate.23  Furthermore, lack of 
community involvement denies the police the careful monitoring of their 
work by the community that permits it to correct police errors.24  As crime 
rates rise, moreover, a “bystander effect results”—more blacks not even 
arrested, let alone prosecuted, for crime find themselves being subjected to 
still more criminal conduct.25  Police inability to stem the flow of 
criminality further erodes citizen-police trust, causing still more crime and 
leaving ordinary citizens to cope with the rising material, social, and 
psychological harm of victimization.26 
Part III examines how each of these effects manifests itself in the 
informant context.  This section also draws analogies between ordinary 
gossip and informants, examining psychological studies on gossip that shed 
light on further reasons why a person’s race raises that person’s chance of 
being falsely convicted.  By “informants,” I mean any persons who are not 
police officers but who pass on information to law enforcement either 
anonymously, so that their credibility cannot easily be judged, or who are 
themselves apparent criminals or who otherwise receive a benefit for their 
efforts so that their credibility is suspect.  This is a broad definition that 
includes: jailhouse informants claiming that they heard the defendant make 
incriminating statements while the two awaited trial in jail or served time 
together; confidential informants—largely meaning criminals who provide 
information to the police in exchange for some overt or implicit benefit but 
who do not testify at trial; “cooperators,” who may testify for the 
prosecution at a trial or hearing, thus revealing their identity, but again in 
exchange for some benefit; and anonymous tipsters, who, because they are 
 
 23. Sociologists Ronald Weitzer and Steven Tuch nicely summarize the data on perceptions 
of the race-crime link that exists even independently of actual crime rates: 
[E]ven where crime is not a serious problem, it is seen as more serious in neighborhoods with 
a larger number of blacks, and this perception is strongest among whites. We also know that 
whites’ fear of crime is greater in areas with higher percentages of minorities in the 
population . . . and that people who associate blacks with crime are inclined to support harsh 
punishment of offenders . . . .  The latter finding indicates that “social threat may be activated 
not only by the residential proximity of racial minorities, but by the conflation of race and 
crime that exists in the minds of many, regardless of where they live . . . . 
RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN AMERICA: CONFLICT AND 
REFORM 11 (2006).  Actual increases in black crime might therefore merely exacerbate pre-
existing biases. 
 24. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with the Power 
to Inspire Political Action, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2003) (analyzing the value of and best 
means for achieving citizen and community oversight of the police). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 194-215. 
 26. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2d. ed. 2006) (extended empirical 
and theoretical defense of the idea that denial of procedural justice discourages obedience to the 
law); see infra text accompanying notes 164-93 (explaining why and how decreased citizen trust 
in the police results in an increased crime rate). 
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anonymous, may include both honest ordinary citizens and criminal 
“stoolies” who do not want to be identified (all such anonymous tipsters 
alert the police to criminal activity or evidence of its occurrence or to the 
purported perpetrator’s identity).27 
Each of these different types of informants raises some similar and 
some different reliability concerns well explained elsewhere.28  Some 
readers may therefore object to my lumping these various informant types 
together, particularly concerning apparent ordinary citizen tips.  I do so, 
however, because I believe that all these informant types create serious risks 
of error when strong corroboration (such as an audiotape of a defendant’s 
purported admissions) is lacking—error likely to arise precisely because of 
police difficulty in determining the veracity of an informant or the accuracy 
of the information upon which he relies.29  Yet, I will argue, these otherwise 
suspect informants’ tales are most likely to be believed by the police when 
 
 27. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 1, 5 (2007), 
available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/snitch-lr.pdf. (defining 
“jailhouse snitches” and explaining why their testimony is “widely regarded as the least reliable 
testimony encountered in the criminal justice system,” while acknowledging that “accomplice 
testimony, and even out-of-custody informant testimony, can be problematic”; jailhouse 
informants may or may not testify at trial) [hereinafter JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY]; HARRY I. 
SUBIN, BARRY BERKE, & ERIC TIRSCHWELL, THE PRACTICE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW: 
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE 15-51, 169-73 (2006) (defining “cooperating defendants” as 
criminal defendants seeking a benefit from the prosecution in exchange for assistance in 
investigating and prosecuting third parties, an umbrella term broad enough to include jailhouse 
snitches, accomplices, and out-of-custody informants as defined by The Justice Project above; 
cooperating informants generally agree to testify, if necessary); ROBERT M. BLOOM, THE USE 
AND ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 1, 31-32, 338-42, 63-65 (2002) 
(defining “confidential informers” as those generally having some continuing relationship with the 
police over time in exchange for some perceived benefit; explaining their critical role in obtaining 
search and arrest warrants and the legal system’s stringent efforts to protect against revelation of 
such informants’ identities; comparing them to “incidental informers,” who have a single contact 
with law enforcement over a single incident and who may receive a one-time payment or may 
instead be acting from civic duty; and further comparing them to “jailhouse informants,” who seek 
to “buy” their freedom); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, MARGARET L. PARIS & LENESE C. HERBERT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 197-200, 211-15, 221-22 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the 
difficulties in judging the trustworthiness of anonymous tips, which can come from ordinary 
citizens, criminals, or other suspect sources).  Confidential informants and anonymous tipsters 
thus rarely testify, while jailhouse snitches and cooperators often do.  The definitions of these and 
similar terms can vary widely depending upon the source consulted, but I have chosen those 
definitions most appropriate for my purposes here.  Terminology is less important here, however, 
than it might be in other contexts, for any reader who disagrees with my definitions or who would 
reject lumping the various types of informants together can nevertheless, I hope, see that my 
theory of racial effects can be helpful in understanding all these phenomena, whether viewed as 
belonging to a common class or to distinct classes of justice system information sources. 
 28. See sources cited supra note 27. 
 29. See JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, supra note 27, at 4-5 (explaining the importance of 
corroborating informants’ reports). 
TASLITZ ARTICLE FINAL MACRO(7-4).DOC 9/2/08  10:52 PM 
106 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
the tales are consistent with culturally-reinforced racial biases.30  Those 
same biases may likewise lead the police to truncate investigation of 
alternative theories of who did the crime,31 and may lead jurors to the same 
close-mindedness suffered by the police.32  This reduced skepticism about 
informants’ reports occurs precisely and most obviously when three of the 
four types—jailhouse informants, confidential informants, and 
cooperators—have strong motives to lie, such as by receiving a benefit 
from the government, perhaps by means of a reduced sentence, immunity 
from prosecution, or hard cash.33  Police are thus most credulous at just the 
time when they should be most skeptical.  But the fourth type of 
informant—the anonymous tipster—raises related, if less obvious concerns, 
too.  First, without knowing the tipsters’ identities, we cannot know 
whether they are “ordinary,” honest citizens.  For example, a tipster drug 
dealer might phone in a tip to frame a competitor or wreak vengeance on an 
enemy or simply to subject him to police scrutiny, though the tipster might 
pose as an ordinary citizen.34  Second, because these tips are anonymous, it 
is hard to determine whether they have a solid evidentiary basis because 
they will never be subjected to the crucible of cross-examination.35 
I will touch on each of these informant types, but only briefly—just as 
much as is necessary to provide the context for understanding my major 
concern: the use of informants’ tips by the police outside of trial to justify a 
search, seizure, or arrest.  My focus is on these circumstances partly 
because their relevance to convicting the innocent has been under-
explored36 and partly because they are just the sorts of instances where the 
 
 30. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11, 145-51. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51. 
 32. Cf. JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, supra note 27, at 5 (noting the importance of 
cautionary jury instructions given jurors’ tendency too readily to believe even the most obviously 
biased of informants—the jailhouse snitches), 144-15 (summarizing leading jurisdiction’s efforts 
to promote adversarial safeguards against lying snitch testimony in at least certain sorts of cases). 
 33. See sources cited supra note 27. 
 34. Cf. BLOOM, supra note 27, at 81 (discussing two informants “whose major incentive for 
serving as informants was to promote their own criminal enterprises through the elimination of 
their competition.”). 
 35. Cf. id. at 36-46 (noting the protection of the identity of confidential—as opposed to 
anonymous—informants has even led police to fabricate the very existence of such informants 
because the officers know that the informants will never be subjected to adversarial scrutiny at 
trial). 
 36. In my constitutional criminal procedure casebook, for example, in writing a section on 
the dangers of wrongful convictions arising from search and arrest warrants issued based upon 
informants’ tips, I was forced to rely on an analogy to the scholarship on testifying informants 
because so little had been written about non-testifying informants’ role in convicting the innocent.  
See TASLITZ, ET AL., supra note 27, at 221-22. 
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risk of lies or mistakes are greatest yet least likely to be detected.37  
Although I thus briefly discuss “cooperators,” as I have defined the term 
here, they are not the focus of my analysis because they do eventually face 
the gauntlet of adversarial safeguards at trial; however much those 
safeguards fail to live up to their billing, their presence is better than their 
absence when seeking to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.38 
The importance of informants used only at this early stage of the 
criminal process in contributing to wrongful convictions is often missed 
precisely because these early-stage informants do not testify at trial.  
Without their testimony, how can they contribute to a mistaken verdict? is 
the unspoken question.  Yet they can do so because they prod the police to 
follow some leads rather than others and to use many of the aggressive 
interrogation techniques described in my first article on this subject, 
summarized above, that lead to the creation of deeply-flawed evidence.39 
That my definition of “informants,” even when narrowed to early-stage 
informants, is a broad one, does not mean, however, that every one of my 
points apply equally to each informant type.  For example, my analogy of 
relying on everyday gossip as a basis for decision making has greatest 
relevance to the problem of anonymous tips—a special form of hearsay 
with properties arguably akin to gossip’s.40  The police have made no 
express deals with such informants.  On the other hand, police and 
prosecutor deals with informants raise special risks that the latter are lying 
or mistaken—risks beyond those raised by the gossip analogy alone.41  
 
 37. Perhaps a better way to phrase the point is that the risk of lies is greatest because they are 
least likely to be detected where informants’ identities are either unknown to police or known only 
to the police handlers because there is no serious independent scrutiny of the informant by more 
independent parties, such as jurors, judges, and defense counsel. 
 38. See JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, supra note 27, at 2 (recommending the uniform use 
of strengthened adversarial safeguards against informant errors or lies, such as written pretrial 
disclosure requirements concerning matters relevant to snitch credibility, pretrial reliability 
hearings, corroboration requirements for testifying informants, and cautionary jury instructions—
all safeguards that presume that the informant will testify at trial and that trial safeguards are 
among the most important for ensuring informant reports’ trustworthiness). 
 39. See infra text accompanying notes 219-57. 
 40. See infra text accompanying notes 280-328. 
 41. This observation stems very simply from the additional motives to lie stemming from the 
non-anonymous informants’ hope of expressly obtaining a benefit from law enforcement in 
exchange for testifying.  See supra text accompanying notes 219-22.  Some anonymous 
informants have incentives to lie that may not be as obvious at the time the tip is received—for 
example, to frame a criminal competitor—while other anonymous informants may not be 
motivated to lie but may be mistaken or relying on the flawed hearsay reports of others.  See supra 
text accompanying notes 26-35 (summarizing the varied nature and motives of anonymous 
informants); infra text accompanying notes 280-328 (making gossip psychology analogy to 
explain how even honest informants’ reports, not to mention dishonest informants’ statements, can 
be subject to grave error). 
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Indeed, such deals raise such grave problems of error that they are 
extraordinarily worrisome.42  Accordingly, I devote most of the discussion 
in other sections of Part III of this article to these especially troubling 
contexts. 
Of course, my concern is not simply with error but with the risk of 
raising it when race enters the picture.  Informants’ tips fingering racial 
minorities play into stereotypes that give the tips unjustifiably strong 
persuasive power.  Furthermore, two of the tip-types on which I focus 
(jailhouse informants and confidential informants), if made by racial 
minority group members, are made by those who are themselves involved 
in crime against other racial minority group members now being labeled as 
criminals—a context enhancing, for example, a subconscious black 
face/criminality link, further leading police to premature judgments about 
guilt and to excessively harsh investigative techniques.43  But police abuse 
of informants is also widely known in the racial communities being policed.  
That knowledge has great potential for creating negative procedural justice 
effects, such as reduced community cooperation with the police in solving 
crime, and for fostering a wide range of other harmful community impacts.  
There is indeed significant reason to believe that both effects are at work.44  
Informants thus potentially serve as a particularly informative real-world 
illustration of the five raced effects outlined in the general theory of racial 
error articulated in Part II of this article.  At the same time, exploration of 
the informant problem in light of the general model defended here reveals 
gaps in the data requiring further research and highlights the urgency of 
quick action to reduce racial bias.  Although more research is needed, I will 
argue that the theories articulated here and converging sources of evidence 
from a variety of sources make the case for bias sufficiently strongly that 
the burden should be on those who oppose reforming the informant system 
to make their case.  Racial bias is just one more quiver in the bow of 
intellectual arrows being shot at the heart of the status quo.  Part IV 
 
 42. See, e.g., BLOOM, supra note 27, at 633 (discussing risks of lies by some classes of 
informants who cut deals to obtain benefits from law enforcement). 
 43. See infra text accompanying notes 216-18 (defining the types of informants); infra text 
accompanying notes 69-111 (analyzing the existence and causes of the broadly socially-
understood—at least at a subconscious level—of a link between being black and being criminal).  
Robert Bloom explains: 
Since much of the crime in America today involve willing participants, the need for 
informants has increased substantially. In order for law enforcement authorities to solve 
crimes such as drug dealing, gambling, loan-sharking, money laundering, and political 
corruption, they need information from individuals who are either closely aligned with the 
participants or are participants themselves. 
 BLOOM, supra note 27, at 7. 
 44. See infra text accompanying notes 329-91. 
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suggests potential solutions to the problem of informant-error based on the 
model outlined above, concluding by summarizing and synthesizing all that 
went before. 
II. ENTRY AND SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF RACE 
This section of this article elaborates upon the five raced effects noted 
above. 
A. The Selection Effect 
The “selection effect” is but another name for the oft-explored problem 
of racial profiling.45  Such profiling can, of course, occur consciously such 
as when an officer dislikes or distrusts racial minorities, thus focusing his 
surveillance efforts on them in the hope of finding evidence of 
wrongdoing.46  I am, however, more interested in subconscious profiling in 
which even consciously well-meaning, anti-racist officers nevertheless find 
themselves drawn to black skin as an indicator of criminality.47  But 
whether done consciously or not, the effects of racial profiling are the same: 
police monitor blacks more than whites, thus finding disproportionately 
more black crimes than white ones.48  A disproportionate influx of black 
suspects leads to greater frequency of the cycle of aggression described in 
my first piece on race and innocence, in which the police misunderstand 
black irritation as an indicator of black guilt and embark on a quest for 
evidence that makes presumed black guilt into a self-fulfilling prophecy.49 
1. The “Other-Race” Effect 
Recent research on the “other-race effect”—the fact that people of one 
race are more likely to misidentify a criminal suspect of another race—
sheds light on these processes.50  That research suggests that early and 
continued disproportionate exposure to same-race faces primes the brain to 
 
 45. See DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT 
WORK (2002) (presenting a thorough analysis of profiling’s causes and consequences). 
 46. See id. at 28-52 (illustrating the conscious application of racial profiling by law 
enforcement). 
 47. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time, 109 PENN. ST. L. 
REV. 1181, 1195-96 (2005) (exploring some of the psychological processes enabling subconscious 
racial profiling to occur). 
 48. See infra text accompanying notes 110-11, 170-93. 
 49. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 125-29. 
 50. Symposium, The Other-Race Effect and Contemporary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness 
Identification and Jury Decision Making, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 (2001) (collecting much 
of the most important research on this topic). 
TASLITZ ARTICLE FINAL MACRO(7-4).DOC 9/2/08  10:52 PM 
110 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
attend carefully to the unique facial features distinguishing one same-race 
face from another.51  Such differential exposure, combined with media and 
cultural influences, however, lead to poor encoding of the features needed 
to differentiate among individual faces once those faces are perceived to be 
of another race.52  This effect is largest when black faces—rather than those 
of any other race—are involved.53  Moreover, efforts to train observers to 
overcome their own-race bias have met with little success;54 some 
researchers maintain that greater experience with other-race faces reduces 
this own-race bias.55 
These raced facial encoding processes have powerful effects on the 
social data to which each of us attends.56  Thus, one researcher found that 
 
 51. See Otto H. Maclin & M. Kimberly Maclin, The Role of Racial Markers in Race 
Perception and Racial Categorization, in PEOPLE WATCHING: THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF VISUAL 
PERCEPTION (R. Adams, N. Ambady, K. Nakayama & S. Shimojo eds., forthcoming 2008) 
(manuscript at 6, 8, on file with authors); Tim Valentine, A Unified Account of the Effects of 
Distinctiveness, Inversion, and Race in Face Recognition, 43A Q. J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
161 (1991) (crafting exemplar model positing that a cognitive facial representation system for 
some-race faces arises based on experience); Tim Valentine, Patrick Chiroro & Ruth Dixon, An 
Account of the Own-Race Bias and the Contact Hypothesis Based on ‘Face Space’ Model of Face 
Recognition, in COGNITIVE AND COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF FACE RECOGNITION 69-94 (Tim 
Valentine ed., 1994) (applying exemplar model to own-race versus other-race recognition). 
 52. See Maclin & Maclin, supra note 51 (manuscript at 8) (discussing encoding problems); 
see also ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: 
MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 78-93 (2000) (analyzing impact of media exposure on perceptions 
of race). 
 53. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 124-30 (summarizing the relevant research on the other-race 
effect and its implications in the wrongful identification of black suspects). 
 54. See, e.g., Alvin G. Goldstein & June E. Chance, Effects of Training on Japanese Face 
Recognition: Reduction of the Other-Race Effect, 23 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 211 (1985) 
(noting modest short term improvements in reducing other-race effect due to training); Elaine S. 
Elliott, Elizabeth J. Wills & Alvin G. Goldstein, The Effects of Discrimination Training on the 
Recognition of White and Oriental Faces, 2 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71 (1973) (noting 
certain training had no significant effect in improving other-race face recognition); Roy S. 
Malpass, Henry Lavigueur & David E. Weldon, Verbal and Visual Training in Face Recognition, 
14 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 285 (1973) (noting that verbal description training had no 
detectable effect on other-race face recognition); Roy S. Malpass, Training in Face Recognition, 
in PERCEIVING AND REMEMBERING FACES 271-84 (Graham Davis, Hadyn Ellis & John Shepherd 
eds., 1981) (reviewing face recognition studies and experiments). 
 55. See Roy. S. Malpass, They All Look Alike to Me, in THE UNDAUNTED PSYCHOLOGISTS: 
ADVENTURES IN RESEARCH (Gary Brannigan & Matthew Merrens eds., 1993) (supporting 
argument that experience with other-race faces matters); Saul Feinman & Doris R. Entwisle, 
Children’s Ability to Recognize Other Children’s Faces, 47 CHILD DEV. 506 (1976) 
(“[D]ifferences between own-race and other-race recognition scores are significant for all children 
except perhaps when the preponderance of people in the child’s neighborhood are of the other 
race.”); John F. Cross, Jane Cross & James Daly, Sex, Race, Age, and Beauty as Factors in 
Recognition of Faces, 10 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 393 (1971) (“For white adolescents, 
however, racial segregation or integration was related to recognition ability.”). 
 56. See Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression of 
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African-American faces “popped out” when embedded in Caucasian faces 
used as distracters.57  But Caucasian faces, by contrast, did not “pop out” 
when African-American faces were used as distracters.58  Experimental 
psychologist Daniel T. Levin has suggested that this quicker and heightened 
attention to black faces “occurs because people code race-specifying 
features at the expense of individuating information.”59  In other words, 
what mattered to observers was recognizing black faces as African-
American rather than culling features needed to recognize that particular 
individual’s face again in the future.60 
The presence of even a single salient feature that serves as a racial 
marker can trigger the racial categorization processes.61  One method used 
to study the impact of racial markers is to craft ambiguous-race faces using 
Adobe Photoshop, then to add a clearer racial marker, examining its effect 
on observers.62  Researchers Otto and Kimberly Maclin described the 
results of their work using hair as a racial marker: 
[By] simply changing the racial marker on the face, the perceptual 
processes were altered.  Identical faces looked like completely different 
individuals.  What came as a surprise was that faces with the African-
American racial marker actually looked darker relative to the faces with 
the Hispanic racial marker.  Essentially the hair feature acted as a racial 
marker which signaled the brain to use different perceptual processes to 
rate, categorize, respond to, and recognize the once ambiguous race faces.  
This suggests that the mechanism involved in cross racial identification is 
a top-down process that affects our perception of virtually identical stimuli 
in a manner similar to the Muller-Lyer illusion in which identical lines are 
perceived as being different lengths depending on which way the arrow 
heads are facing . . . . As with the Muller-Lyer illusion . . . the racial 
marker has a profound effect that forces us to view identical faces 
differently!63 
 
Dissent, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79 (2007) (analyzing the impact of raced facial encoding 
processes on perception and critiquing their role in the “Facial Action Coding System” used to 
identify potential terrorists at airports). 
 57. Daniel T. Levin, Classifying Faces by Race: The Structure of Face Categories, 22 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY, & COGNITION 1364, 1375-78 (1996). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Daniel T. Levin, Race as a Visual Feature: Using Visual Search and Perceptual 
Discrimination Tasks to Understand Face Categories and the Cross-Race Recognition Deficit, 
129 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: GEN. 559, 561 (2000); Maclin & Maclin, supra note 51 
(manuscript at 8) (describing Levin’s research). 
 60. See Maclin & Maclin, supra note 51 (manuscript at 8-9). 
 61. See id. (manuscript at 22-23). 
 62. See id. (manuscript at 8-9). 
 63. See id. (manuscript at 23). 
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The Maclins argue that electro-encephalographic studies of the time 
needed to process other-race faces, the increased involvement of the 
amygdala, which plays a crucial role in the identification of threat, and 
other physiological studies all support the following model of cognitive 
brain processing: once a face is identified as that of another’s race, a 
“cognitive gating mechanism” shifts further processing away from 
individual face-recognition to threat-recognition portions of the brain.64  
Simply put, white faces are more likely to be individualized as unique 
persons, while black faces are lumped together as generalized indicators of 
threat.65  Research on race-based personality judgments supports this 
conclusion—African-American faces, for example, being described as more 
assertive and cold than Caucasian faces.66  A host of other studies confirms 
observers’ readiness to make negative judgments about the character traits 
of persons perceived to have African-American faces.67  The Maclins 
summarize much of the research this way: 
Thus, the brain has a propensity to detect very early in the time course of 
perception, the presence of threat.  Threatening objects (or faces) must 
then be processed differently, and are processed differently for an 
evolutionarily adaptive purpose.  Threatening objects are important 
information in the environment, and the . . . studies demonstrate that out-
group members are perceived by the brain as threatening and thus that 
threat alters the information extracted from the situation.68 
2. The Race/Criminal Record Synthesis 
Observations that are consistent with racial stereotyping receive more 
attention than those that are not and heighten the grip of those stereotypes.69  
One of the most powerful heighteners is an observer’s knowledge of a 
suspect’s criminal record.70  African-Americans with criminal records will 
 
 64. See id. (manuscript at 1, 12-13, 23). 
 65. See id. (manuscript at 1, 12-13). 
 66. See id. (manuscript at 10); see also Daniel T. Levin & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Distortions in 
the Perceived Lightness of Faces: The Role of Race Categories, 135 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL: 
GEN 501 (2006). 
 67. See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 56, at 99-108; Taslitz, supra note 1, at 124-25. 
 68. Maclin & Maclin, supra note 51 (manuscript at 13). 
 69. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 124-28. 
 70. Cf. John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 
44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 21 (1983) (offering an example illustrating that 
stereotypes are most likely to be reinforced and activated for persons matching on more than one 
dimension of the stereotype); Lincoln Quillian & Devah Pager, Black Neighbors, Higher Crime?: 
The Role of Racial Stereotypes in Evaluation of Neighborhood Crime, 107 AM. J. SOC. 717 (2001) 
(discussing a study that “supports the view that stereotypes are influencing perceptions of 
neighborhood crime levels[]”); Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes 
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thus be perceived as especially great threats and will prove particularly 
resistant to being perceived as complete, unique individuals.71  This 
observation will prove to be particularly important in connection with 
informants, for the police are often likely to know or to discover the 
criminal record of someone fingered by a “snitch.”72 
Sociologists have long documented the stigmatic effects of race and the 
ways in which those effects arise—studies that are fully consistent with the 
psychological ones described above.73  Indeed, sociologists increasingly 
incorporate into their studies the work of social psychologists.74  The two 
fields combined reveal a wealth of research demonstrating a close assumed 
connection between race and crime.75  An observer’s negative response to a 
criminal act is magnified when the offender is African-American.76  Indeed, 
the offender’s race leads to an increased likelihood of interpreting a crime 
as especially reprehensible, meriting greater punishment.77  Observers are 
also better able to recall incriminating evidence and less able to recall 
exculpating evidence when the offender is a racial minority.78  This 
“confirmation bias,” by making negative information more salient than 
 
Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 
(1995) (discussing how stereotyping in American culture associates certain races with crime). 
 71. See DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 68-69 (2007). 
 72. Criminal history is readily available via technology today.  Police are likely to know the 
criminal history and reputation of those persons in the neighborhood where they police—persons 
who in turn often have knowledge of third parties’ criminality, sometimes gaining that knowledge 
by their own involvement in crime.  See, e.g., ROBERT M. BLOOM, RATTING: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF INFORMANTS IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 124, app. D at 132, 134 (2002) 
(noting Department of Justice guidelines, which require any agent planning to use a confidential 
informant to collect and consider certain information in assessing the suitability of the informant, 
including “whether the person has a criminal history, is reasonably believed to be the subject or 
target of a pending criminal investigation, is under arrest, or has been charged in a pending 
prosecution . . . .”). 
 73. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 126-27 (summarizing literature). 
 74. See, e.g., PAGER, supra note 71, at 7-71. 
 75. See, e.g., id. at 7-71. 
 76. See id. at 70. 
 77. See Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About 
Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483 (2004) (finding that police and probation 
officers viewing crime vignettes with the offender’s race unstated, but who were unconsciously 
primed with images of words associated with African-Americans, viewed the juvenile offender as 
more culpable, meriting harsher sanctions than without the race prime). 
 78. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and 
Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 726 
(1988); see Lawrence D. Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth 
Century, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 264, 279 (Neil. J. 
Smelser, William Julius Wilson & Faith Mitchell eds. 2001). 
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positive, makes it harder to overcome racial stereotypes.79 
Another line of research has explored how the presence of a criminal 
record interacts with race to intensify stereotyping effects.80  Although this 
research is in its early stages and may involve small sample sizes, limiting 
the confidence that we can place in its results, there is little, if any, work 
undermining these conclusions.81  Furthermore, the consistency of the 
evidence from various sources combined with well-accepted psychological 
theory lends further support to the most important conclusion made by these 
researchers: a criminal record amplifies racial-threat perceptions 
dramatically.82 
One recent study illustrates the phenomenon.83  This study examined 
the efforts of testers with identical and strong resumes to obtain jobs.84  The 
race of the testers and the presence or absence of their having a criminal 
record was varied.85  Otherwise the members of tester teams were matched 
to have similar ages, physical appearance, and “general style of self-
presentation.”86 
The results of this study were striking.87  Where neither black nor white 
testers had criminal records, blacks were still only half as likely to receive 
callbacks as were whites.88  But, even more unsettling, whites with criminal 
records were just as likely to receive callbacks as blacks without criminal 
 
 79. PAGER, supra note 71, at 71.  Confirmation bias is defined as “the tendency to seek and 
interpret information that confirms existing beliefs.”  ARTHUR S. REBER & EMILY S. REBER, THE 
PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 145 (3d ed. 2002). 
 80. See, e.g., PAGER, supra note 71, at 41-57. 
 81. See id. (summarizing and critiquing the research). 
 82. See id.  Interestingly, one experimental study found that even an acquittal can harm a 
participant’s job prospects.  Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal 
Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133 (1962).  Several later studies similarly suggest that mere contact with 
the criminal justice system has stigmatic effects likely to alter material opportunities.  See, e.g., 
Dov Cohen & Richard E. Nisbett, Field Experiments Examining the Culture of Honor: The Role 
of Institutions in Perpetuating Norms About Violence, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 
1188 (1997); R.H. Finn & Patricia A. Fontaine, The Association Between Selected Characteristics 
and Perceived Employability of Offenders, 12 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 353 (1985); Roger Boshier 
& Derek Johnson, Does Conviction Affect Employment Opportunities?, 14 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 
264 (1974); Wouter Buikhuisen & Fokke P. H. Dijksterhuis, Research and Methodology: 
Delinquency and Stigmatisation, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 185 (1971); Theodore S. Palys, An 
Assessment of Legal and Cultural Stigma Regarding Unskilled Workers, 18 CANADIAN J. 
CRIMINOLOGY & CORRECTIONS 247 (1976). 
 83. PAGER, supra note 71, at 58-59, 90-91. 
 84. Id. at 59. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 90-91. 
 88. Id. at 90. 
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records.89  This observation held even with employers comparing whites 
just released from prison for felony drug convictions with blacks who had 
completely clean criminal histories.90  This result seems consistent with 
sociologist Elijah Anderson’s conclusion that “the anonymous black male is 
usually an ambiguous figure who arouses the utmost caution and is 
generally considered dangerous until he proves he is not.”91 
The presence of a criminal record reduces a black applicant’s chance of 
a callback still further, by more than 60%.92  Moreover, the ratio of 
callbacks for non-offenders versus offenders was 3:1 for blacks and 2:1 for 
whites—though this difference was not statistically significant—since the 
black sample size was so small, that is, so few blacks got callbacks in the 
first place that it is hard to judge the significance of these differentials in 
callback ratios.93  Personal contact by black testers having criminal records 
with potential employers did little to improve their chances in the job 
market, even when these testers had opportunities for extended discussions 
with their interviewers.94  But the penalty of a criminal record dropped from 
70-20% for white testers who actually met with their potential employers, 
their callback rate becoming five times greater once they had a chance to 
meet the employer—and this racial differential was statistically 
significant.95  Employers seemed more willing to view a white tester’s 
single criminal conviction as a “regrettable mistake,” personal contact 
readily convincing the employer that the white tester had “learned his 
lesson.”96  But knowledge of a black tester’s criminal record “weaken[ed] 
any incentive to give a young black man the benefit of the doubt.”97  
Convictions for crimes of violence and imposition of prison sentences, 
moreover, amplify a criminal conviction’s stigmatizing effects.98 
Although this study dealt with employment decisions rather than arrest 
decisions, its reflection of deeper psychological processes of threat-
detection is suggestive of similar processes being at work in connection 
with police investigation.  African-Americans are disproportionately 
involved in the criminal justice system considering that at any given time 
 
 89. Id. at 90-91. 
 90. Id. at 91. 
 91. ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN 
COMMUNITY 190 (1990). 
 92. PAGER, supra note 71, at 69. 
 93. Id. at 69. 
 94. Id. at 104-06. 
 95. Id. at 104, 106. 
 96. Id. at 101-02. 
 97. Id. at 101. 
 98. See id. at 123, 126. 
TASLITZ ARTICLE FINAL MACRO(7-4).DOC 9/2/08  10:52 PM 
116 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
12% of all young black men between the ages of 25 and 29 are behind bars, 
while only 1.7% of whites in that age range are incarcerated.99  Over a 
lifetime, nearly one-third of young black men will spend time in prison.100  
These percentages are likely to be highest in the low-income, racially-
concentrated neighborhoods in which police focus many of their 
resources.101  Furthermore, in ambiguous or high-pressure situations, those 
often typical of police-citizen contact, observers’ perceptions of black 
aggressiveness and threat are particularly powerful.102  Additionally, police 
are drawn from the general population and that population is in the grip of a 
race-crime link so strong that in one study, in which observers watched a 
news clip describing a murder, “over 40% of subjects falsely recalled 
having seen a black perpetrator.”103  In another study, subjects told to shoot 
at potentially armed targets in a video game “are quicker to do so when the 
target is African-American.”104  Ample studies find that police are equally 
and perhaps even more strongly in the grip of these threat-linked racial 
stereotypes than are ordinary citizens.105 
Simultaneously, a criminal conviction is severely stigmatizing, 
particularly when incarceration or violence is involved.106  A conviction is 
viewed as an indicator of fundamental negative personality traits, a 
 
 99. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BULLETIN: PRISON AND JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR, 2005 1 (2006); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
BULLETIN: CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1997 5 (2000). 
 100. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SPECIAL REPORT: LIFETIME 
LIKELIHOOD OF GOING TO STATE OR FEDERAL PRISON 1 (1997); see also Becky Pettit & Bruce 
Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Equality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 
AM. SOC. REV. 151 (2004) (“High incarceration rates led researchers to claim that prison time had 
become a normal part of the early adulthood for black men in poor urban neighborhoods.”). 
 101. See generally TODD R. CLEAR, IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS 
INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE (2007). 
 102. See Taslitz, supra note 47, at 1195-96 (analyzing urgency’s impact on police perceptions 
of black threat). 
 103. PAGER, supra note 71, at 95 (summarizing research showing racially-skewed memory 
recall); see also Franklin D. Gilliam & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local 
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 560, 564 (2000) (making similar 
point). 
 104. See PAGER, supra note 71, at 95. 
 105. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra, note 1, at 126-29 (analyzing how subconscious racial 
stereotyping affects officer judgments to view blacks as embodying criminality).  But see 
CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL 
COURTROOM 175-99 (2003) (conceding that, as to one subset of police-race studies—police use 
of force—the bulk of the research argues that perception of such non-racial factors as whether a 
suspect is armed is the primary determinant of whether force is used, but, in contradiction to the 
studies, arguing that race likely influences police perceptions of whether a suspect is indeed armed 
in the first place). 
 106. See PAGER, supra note 71, at 115-16. 
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perception affecting laymen and legal elites alike, the elite judgment even 
being embodied in evidence codes that mark a criminal felony record as a 
sign that the ex-felon is not to be trusted.107  All persons, or at least all 
Westerners, make character judgments based on skimpy evidence allowing 
one negative character trait to infect perceptions of a person’s entire 
personality (the “devil’s horns effect”) and often give it significantly more 
weight than it deserves in predicting future behavior.108  Police are no 
different.  “Round up the usual suspects” becomes their implicit battle 
cry.109 
The consequences for the raced nature of informant use may be dire.  
First, police are disproportionately likely to arrest black than white suspects 
in general.  If that same pattern of disparate racial impact holds for the 
subset of arrests involving informants, that will mean that proportionately 
more blacks than whites will face the risks of an innocent man being 
fingered by a lying or mistaken tipster that are inherent in reliance on 
informants.  But this raises the risk of error beyond what it would be for 
most tip-based arrests because being black, for example, makes police more 
likely to assume the suspect’s guilt and to use aggressive investigation and 
flawed techniques.110  Second, when an informant turns in an African-
 
 107. See id. at 71-72, 115-16; STEVEN I. FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN & ANDREW E. 
TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 148-57 (3d ed., 2007) (analyzing the theory behind 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which permits introducing a witness’ felony convictions to prove 
that he has a character for untruthfulness). 
 108. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological 
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV.1, 108-13 (1993) (analyzing lay psychology of character 
judgments); Herbert, supra note 56, at 119 (explaining the “devil’s horns” effect); ROBERT E. 
NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND WESTERNERS THINK 
DIFFERENTLY . . . AND WHY 29-46 (2003) (arguing that some cognitive biases concerning 
character may be far stronger in Western than Asian cultures). 
 109. Cf. RICHARD THOMSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES 
RACE RELATIONS WORSE 233-45 (2008) (analyzing police use of race to round up “the usual 
suspects,” though seeing the practice as sometimes justified); ROBERT JACKALL, STREET 
STORIES: THE WORLD OF POLICE DETECTIVES 220-21 (2005) (describing police use of a person’s 
criminal record in assessing likely involvement in new criminality and opining that “[t]he 
premises of the system are that criminals break laws regularly and that sooner or later their own 
actions and habits of mind will lead them into legal entanglements, most often in the local area 
where they practice their trades . . . .”). 
 110. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 48-90 (summarizing data on racial profiling).  Sociologist 
Devah Pager effectively summarized the work of two researchers on the likelihood of racial 
profiling leading to wrongful convictions: 
Farmer and Terrell begin with the assumption that the higher rates of criminal activity 
among African Americans provide useful information in evaluating the criminal 
propensities of an unknown African American individual.  Their estimates, however, 
suggest that such inferences alone (without other mediating information) produce a rate 
of error whereby—at its logical extreme—an innocent African-American would be 
almost five times more likely to be wrongfully convicted of a violent crime than an 
innocent white individual (eight times, in the case of murder). 
TASLITZ ARTICLE FINAL MACRO(7-4).DOC 9/2/08  10:52 PM 
118 SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
American suspect with a criminal record, police are particularly likely to 
find that tip credible.111  This suspension of skepticism about tipsters can 
divert their attention from alternative, perhaps more likely, theories about 
who did the crime, the “blinders effect” that I now describe below. 
B. Blind Loyalty 
“Loyalty to petrified opinion,” said Mark Twain, “never yet broke a 
chain or freed a human soul.”112  Yet police loyalty to an idea has enchained 
the innocent and freed the guilty by obscuring police vision of the true 
wrongdoers, for clarifying their vision by seeking a new pair of conceptual 
glasses would be understood by their comrades in blue as a betrayal of 
commitment to the idea that the initial suspect must be the right suspect.113 
Loyalty involves a special kind of emotional commitment—“an 
identification with the object of one’s loyalty rather than with its 
competitors.”114  Our own well being thus requires that we watch out for 
that of a particular other.115  A loyal husband does not, therefore, leave his 
spouse after the first spat, for doing so would harm the husband himself as 
well as his wife.116  True loyalty stems less from logic than from 
engagement with particular others; loyalty fosters acts of commitment in 
the face of adversity rather than a simple weighing of the immediate costs 
and benefits of a relationship.117 
The emotional sense of loyalty must, however, be distinguished from 
the moral duty to be loyal.  That duty generally requires reciprocity—I am 
 
PAGER, supra note 71, at 193 n.24 (citing Amy Farmer & Dek Terrell, Crime versus Justice: Is 
There a Trade-Off?, 44 J. L. & ECON. 345, 345-66 (2001)). 
 111. Cf. Taslitz, supra note 1, at 125-33 (crafting argument that most criminal justice system 
actors, the police included, and all else being equal, will find black suspects less credible than 
white ones). 
 112. Mark Twain, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 329 (Hugh 
Rawson & Margaret Miner eds., 2d ed. 2006). 
 113. Cf. Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 
HOW. L.J. 475 (2006) (defending similar position but focusing more on prosecutors than on the 
police). 
 114. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 8 
(1993). 
 115. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: Loyalty and Criminal Justice, 49 HOW. L.J. 405, 408 
(2006). 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
This profound sense of connection to another cannot come from a mere logical sense of 
moral obligation.  True loyalty stems from a history of engagement with particular others—
from the husband and wife’s years of struggling together—rather than from a simple 
weighing of the benefits of staying against the costs of leaving. 
Id. 
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loyal to you, if you are loyal to me.118  Once that duty is triggered and 
combined with the feeling of loyalty, avoiding breach of the duty “may be 
understood as an expression of self-esteem and self-acceptance.  To love 
myself, I must respect and cherish those aspects of myself that are bound up 
with others.”119 
Loyalty can be a good or bad thing, its moral quality partly turning on 
what is the object of one’s loyalty.120  Loyalty to Nazis is not the same thing 
as loyalty to sons, daughters, or lovers.121 
Loyalty can extend not only to a person, group, organization, or nation, 
but to an idea—for certain types of commitments to ideas are part and 
parcel of our loyalty to individuals or aggregations.122  “For example, a 
person who rejects the existence of Jesus Christ and the historical truth of 
the Book of Mormon and the teachings of Joseph Smith cannot fairly be 
described as a ‘loyal’ member of The Latter Day Saints.”123  “Loyalty to 
these ideas is thus constitutive of loyalty to the church and to its 
members.”124 
For the police, therein lies the rub.  Police have a difficult and 
dangerous job.  Moreover, they often come to believe that they have a 
heightened ability as compared to laymen to sniff out the suspicious, spot 
the liar, and ferret out the truth.125  Yet, studies have shown that police can 
sometimes do worse than laymen at spotting liars precisely because police 
are, in practice, no better than lay citizens at this task, but often believe 
otherwise, too often not having the skepticism about their own judgments 
needed to correct error.126  Police are also often under intense pressure to 
catch the bad guys, especially in high-profile cases, and are subject to the 
same cognitive biases, irrational thinking, and confusion as the rest of us.127  
Simultaneously, there is often a bond of brotherhood among officers, a 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. See FLETCHER, supra note 114, at 16. 
 120. Cf. AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE: THE ILLUSION OF DESTINY (2006) 
(exploring the connections among loyalty, genocide, moral codes, self-deception, and violence). 
 121. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME 100 (2006). 
 122. See Taslitz, supra note 115, at 409-10. 
 123. Id.; see generally THE BOOK OF MORMON: ANOTHER TESTAMENT OF JESUS CHRIST 
(Joseph Smith trans., 1981). 
 124. Taslitz, supra note 114, at 410; cf. RANDALL KENNEDY, SELLOUT: THE POLITICS OF 
RACIAL BETRAYAL (2008) (analyzing what it means to be loyal to one’s racial group). 
 125. See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “You’re Guilty, So Just Confess!” 
Cognitive and Behavioral Confirmation Bias in the Interrogation Room, in INTERROGATIONS, 
CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 85, 90-93 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004). 
 126. See id. at 93-94. 
 127. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 130-31. 
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sense of having one another’s back, of “us” (law enforcement) against 
“them” (criminals, liberal judges, and politicians).128  This combination of 
forces can lead officers to latch onto a theory of who is guilty and to work it 
for all it is worth, to the detriment of exploring other options.129  Fellow 
officers assist, where needed, in seeking confirming over disconfirming 
evidence.130  Challenges to the initial theory or to the diligent work of 
fellow officers breed resentment, being seen as a betrayal of the bonds of 
loyalty that weld officers together;131 the result is “the inability of human 
beings to admit mistakes.”132 
The Commission appointed by former Illinois Governor George Ryan 
to recommend ways to avoid convicting the innocent in death penalty cases 
saw combating police tunnel vision as central to its task.133  Indeed, its very 
first recommendation for changes in police and pre-trial investigation 
procedures was as follows: “After a suspect has been identified, the police 
should continue to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether these 
point towards or away from the suspect.”134  This recommendation was 
modeled after Section 23(i)(a) of England’s Criminal Procedure and 
Investigations Act of 1996.135  The Ryan Commission concluded that the 
similar British entreaty in that statute had at least some effect in broadening 
police minds, if only because officers feared “potentially embarrassing 
cross-examination at trial.”136  Likewise, the British statute caused cultural 
and material resources to be committed to officer education and training to 
 
 128. Taslitz, supra note 24 (analyzing “us” versus “them” attitude of the police); People v. 
McMurty, 314 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (noting that police see themselves as in a war 
against liberal judges and politicians (quoting Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, THE NATION, 
May 8, 1967, at 546)). 
 129. Cf. Bandes, supra note 113, at 479-84 (making similar argument but primarily as to 
prosecutors). 
 130. See Taslitz, supra note 24 at 128 (arguing that police officers often work to support each 
others’ judgment against what they perceive to be a hostile outside world).  This “confirmation 
bias” is one of the heuristics by which all persons, not just the police, make their way in the world.  
See, e.g., ANDREW NEWBERG & MARK ROBERT WALDMAN, WHY WE BELIEVE WHAT WE 
BELIEVE: UNCOVERING OUR BIOLOGICAL NEED FOR MEANING, SPIRITUALITY, AND TRUTH 254 
(2006) (defining “confirmation bias” and explaining its significance). 
 131. See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 24, at 128. 
 132. SCOTT TUROW, ULTIMATE PUNISHMENT: A LAWYER’S REFLECTIONS ON DEALING WITH 
THE DEATH PENALTY (2003); see also Barry Siegel, Presumed Guilty: An Illinois Murder Case 
Became a Test of Conscience Inside the System, L.A. TIMES MAG., Nov. 1, 1992, at 19. 
 133. See STATE OF ILLINOIS OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S 
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 20 (2002) [hereinafter Ryan Commission Report, after 
George H. Ryan, the Governor who appointed the Commission]. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
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remove their blinders.137  The Ryan Commission noted that Canada too, in 
the Morin Inquiry Report in Ontario, urged departments to foster a police 
culture in which admitting inevitable mistakes is encouraged,138 and in the 
Sophonow Inquiry Report in Manitoba recommended mandatory annual 
officer training against early theory commitment,139 for tunnel vision 
“results in the officer becoming so focused upon an individual or incident 
that no other person or incident registers in the officer’s thoughts.  Thus, 
tunnel vision can result in the elimination of other suspects who should be 
investigated.”140  For the Sophonow Special Commissioner, premature 
theory commitment was a “virus” infecting the body politic.141  A similar 
virus, various commentators have suggested, has played a role in wrongful 
convictions in the United States, including in, according to the Ryan 
Commission, Illinois capital cases.142  The virus causes police blindness to 
flawed or inconsistent evidence, whether from lying informants, mistaken 
eyewitnesses, or a host of other warning lights that the police did not see 
flashing.143 
The “confirmatory bias” favoring evidence supporting our beliefs, the 
“selective information processing” motivating us to defend those beliefs in 
the face of conflicting evidence, and “belief perseverance” even in the face 
of discredited theories are all well-documented cognitive phenomena.144  In 
combination they mean that “people are more likely to attend to, seek out 
and evaluate evidence that is consistent with their beliefs, and ignore or 
downplay evidence that is inconsistent with their beliefs.”145  These 
processes act like a filter promoting “knowledge avoidance” from the very 
early stages of cognitive processing.146  In psychologist Anthony 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 21; see also Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the Criminal 
Process, A.B.A., Achieving Justice: Freeing the Innocent, Convicting the Guilty, 2006 A.B.A. 
CRIM. JUST. SEC. 5 (summarizing Morin Inquiry Report) [hereinafter Achieving Justice]. 
 139. Ryan Commission Report, supra note 133, at 1-14 (discussing the Sophonow Inquiry 
Report’s relevance to the Illinois’ inquiry). 
 140. Id. at 21 (quoting Sophonow Inquiry Report); see also Manitoba Justice: The Inquiry 
Regarding Thomas Sophonow, http://www.gov.mb.ca/justice/publications/sophonow/toc.html 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Sophonow Inquiry Report]. 
 141. See Sophonow Inquiry Report, supra note 140, at 13-14. 
 142. See Ryan Commission Report, supra note 133, at 20-21. 
 143. See id. at 20-21; see generally Achieving Justice, supra note 138 (surveying the many 
kinds of error that can lead to wrongful convictions). 
 144. See Bandes, supra note 113, at 491. 
 145. Jonathan A. Fugelsang & Kevin N. Dunbar, A Cognitive Neuroscience Framework for 
Understanding Causal Reasoning and the Law, in LAW AND THE BRAIN 157, 160 (Semir Zeki & 
Oliver Goodenough eds.,2004); see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision 
Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006). 
 146. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Self-Knowledge and Self-Deception: Further 
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Greenwald’s words, we “need not know specifically what is inside the 
envelope to judge that it should be discarded.”147  So long as the envelope is 
labeled, “disconfirming evidence,” it will be ignored.148  For the reasons 
just explained, police incentives and training too often exacerbate these 
cognitive biases, or at the very least do nothing to combat them.149  
Particularly when combined with racial biases, the results can be troubling. 
The process may work as follows: selection bias leads police 
disproportionately to focus their attention on black suspects.  Suspects’ 
resentful reactions heighten police suspicions.150  Police loyalty to this early 
theory of criminal liability leads them to “leap to a conclusion that the 
person who is a suspect is in fact the guilty party.  Once that conclusion is 
made, investigative efforts . . . center on marshalling facts and assembling 
evidence which will convict that suspect, rather than continuing with the 
objective investigation of other possible suspects.”151  An initial racial 
selection bias affecting who enters the criminal justice system thus turns 
into a conviction bias, compounding the ill effects of the officers’ mistaken 
early choices. 
C. The Ratchet Effect 
The “ratchet effect” results from police misallocation of resources.152  
Professor Bernard E. Harcourt has explored the operation of the ratchet 
effect under assumptions of “non-spurious” profiling that is, assuming that 
the police-targeted population in fact offends at a higher rate than other 
populations.153  The ratchet works over time to ensure that the incarcerated 
population will contain an ever-increasing percentage of the profiled 
population—a percentage well above even its higher relative offending 
rates in the general population.154  Harcourt offers a colorful analogy to 
 
Considerations, in THE MYTHOMANIAS: THE NATURE OF DECEPTION AND SELF-DECEPTION 57 
(Michael S. Myslobodsky ed., 1997). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Bandes, supra note 113, at 491-92 (applying Greenwald’s theory to prosecutorial 
tunnel vision). 
 149. See supra text accompanying notes 108, 127. 
 150. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 125-27. 
 151. Ryan Commission Report, supra note 133, at 20. 
 152. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND 
PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 147 (2007). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Harcourt explains: 
By ratchet effect, I have in mind a very specific social phenomenon that occurs in multiple 
stages.  In simple terms, it is a disproportionality that grows over time.  The 
disproportionality in question is between the makeup of the offending population and the 
make-up of the carceral population—that is, the population that has criminal justice contacts 
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illustrate the point: 
Imagine that the fishing boats from a village in southern Spain troll at 
random two bodies of water—the Atlantic ocean, where cod are relatively 
sparse, and the Mediterranean, where sea bass are plentiful.  The waters 
are far more dense with fish in the Mediterranean, and an average day’s 
catch nets twice as many bass as a day in the Atlantic nets cod.  When the 
captains fish in an entirely uncoordinated and random manner, the catch of 
the day in the village includes both cod and sea bass.  However, if the 
captains coordinate and decide to fish a lot more in the dense 
Mediterranean, then, at the end of the day, the catch will be larger in 
overall quantity and will contain proportionally far more sea bass.  By 
shifting more fishing to the higher-density Mediterranean, the captains 
both increase the overall catch and skew it toward sea bass.155 
Of course, because the captains net more overall catch by diverting 
more resources to the Mediterranean, assuming that their resources are 
fixed, they will likely choose in the future to divert a still greater percentage 
of their resources to that location.  That will indeed further increase their 
total catch, but it will also skew that catch even more disproportionately 
toward bass.  In the extreme, the fishermen will fish only in the 
Mediterranean, thus catching almost only bass, to the ever-lasting joy of the 
unfettered cod!  This is the ratchet effect at work in the fishing industry. 
In the policing industry, the higher-offending group are the bass, the 
lower-offending group the cod.156  If police are looking only to incapacitate 
offenders, ignoring whether police procedures themselves alter incentives 
concerning who offends, they will devote increasingly greater percentages 
of their limited resources, up to some “natural” stopping point, to the 
higher-offending group, raising the percentage of that group incarcerated to 
well above even their higher percentage of the offending population.157  
Moreover, police will likely use arrest and incarceration data as a proxy for 
true offending rates.158  A self-fulfilling prophecy results: differentials in 
 
such as arrest, conviction, fine, probation, imprisonment, parole, or other supervision.  So, 
for instance, if drywall contractors comprise 10 percent of actual tax evaders but 40 percent 
of persons convicted of tax evasion, there is an imbalance between the offending population 
and the carceral population.  If the IRS then uses the carceral population to allocate more 
resources to drywall contractors, that imbalance will increase.  Over time, this process of 
increasing disproportionality represents what I call a ratchet. 
Id. 
 155. Id. at 147-48. 
 156. Id. at 148. 
 157. See id. at 148-60 (illustrating the impact of this effect under a variety of assumptions). 
 158. In the words of Peter Verniero, the Attorney General of New Jersey: “To a large extent, 
these statistics have been used to grease the wheels of a vicious cycle—a self-fulfilling prophecy 
where law enforcement agencies rely on arrest data that they themselves generated as a result of 
the discretionary allocation of resources and targeted drug enforcement efforts.”  PETER 
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police resource allocation between the two groups mean ever-more arrests 
and convictions of members of the higher relative to the lower offending 
group.159  This pattern makes the higher-offending group look to have even 
greater an offending rate than is the case, again leading to more resources 
focused on incapacitating that group on apparent grounds of efficiency, 
effectiveness, and protecting public safety.160  No racial animus is 
required.161 
Consider how much worse this problem can be, however, if, because of 
the selection effect, the seemingly higher-offending group in fact never 
offended at a greater rate than lower-offending ones in the first place or at 
least did not offend at quite as high a rate as the police originally perceived.  
Furthermore, because the selection and blindness effects increase the risk of 
convicting the innocent by using overly-aggressive and flawed investigative 
techniques and ignoring alternative leads, the increased resource-shifting to 
incapacitating the perceived higher-offending group that results from the 
ratchet effect should involve a disproportionate “catch” of the innocent and, 
given still more energetic, resource-enriched investigative techniques, 
trigger a higher rate of police errors in whom they arrest and seek to 
prosecute.162  Additionally, police see what they believe to be increasing 
evidence that they are “right” to target the supposedly higher-offending 
group.163  One raced procedural error compounds another. 
D. The Procedural Justice Effect 
Police behavior can also alter citizen’s perceptions of the police.164  But 
those perceptions can in turn have concrete, often negative, impacts on both 
the communities policed and the broader society.165  Procedural justice and 
 
VERNIERO & PAUL H. ZOUBEK, INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW REGARDING 
ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 68 (1999), available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ 
intm_419.pdf. 
 159. See HARCOURT, supra note 152, at 147-60. 
 160. See id. at 148-60. 
 161. See id. at 147-60. 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 112-51 (explaining the impact of the selection and 
blinders effects). 
 163. See HARCOURT, supra note 152, at 148-60. 
 164. See id. at 119-21 (summarizing data suggesting that African-American’s “personal 
experiences” with profiling contributes to their disproportionately negative views of the criminal 
justice system); TYLER & HUO, supra note 21, at 196-97 (concluding, based upon a review of the 
empirical data, that “having had a personal experience with a legal authority changes how an 
individual thinks about those authorities and about the institutions associated with them . . . .”). 
 165. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 45, at 94-128 (summarizing the individual, communal, and 
social ill effects of real and perceived racial profiling); LEE, supra note 105, at 178 (arguing that 
we should care about perceptions of racially-biased policing, including the use of force, because 
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related branches of psychological research have for decades explored these 
perception-based phenomena.166  The primary results of this research are 
that procedures perceived as fair and that are administered by authorities 
perceived as trustworthy increase citizen willingness to obey the law and to 
cooperate with the police.167  Crime thus falls while more offenders are 
apprehended.168  Correspondingly, unfair procedures can increase crime 
and decrease citizen-police cooperation.169 
Although scholars differ on how they define fair procedures, one 
helpful scheme crafted by leading researchers in the field divides fair 
procedures into two categories: “(1) quality of decisonmaking[, meaning] 
the perceived neutrality and consistency [of authorities]—and (2) the 
quality of treatment[, meaning] being treated [by the authorities] with 
dignity and respect, having one’s rights acknowledged.”170  
Trustworthiness, the perception that the authorities are concerned about 
your needs, affects citizen response to legal authorities along with the 
 
“actual or perceived unfairness and racial bias in law enforcement undermines police  
effectiveness[—s]immering tensions between communities of color and the police, if unaddressed, 
can ignite into chaos.”). 
 166. See Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, in HANDBOOK OF JUSTICE 
RESEARCH IN LAW 65-92 (Joseph Sanders and V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001) (surveying the 
procedural justice literature); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (synthesizing the teachings of procedural justice research); YUEN J. 
HUO & TOM R. TYLER, HOW DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO LEGAL AUTHORITY (2000) 
(applying procedural justice research to police-community relations). 
 167. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 6, 82-102 
(1997) (cataloguing positive attitudinal and behavioral effects of according procedural justice and 
many of the factors affecting perceptions of such justice); TYLER & HUO, supra note 21, at xiv 
(noting importance to procedural justice of the sense of being given fair process by authorities 
whose motives make them seem trustworthy). 
 168. See HUO & TYLER, supra note 166, at 61 (“Previous studies have linked procedural 
fairness to actual behavior.  A reanalysis of data from the Milwaukee Domestic Violence 
Experiment, for example, showed that procedural fairness perceptions actually suppressed 
subsequent violence among individuals who were arrested for domestic abuse.”). 
 169. Tyler and Huo are worth quoting extensively on this point: 
Looking at these issues another way, we can say that police and court activities that offend or 
alienate the public are unlikely to be effective in controlling crime in the long term.  Unfair 
or disrespectful treatment by particular police officers or judges influences people’s general 
evaluations of the police and the courts and their overall respect for the law.  Losing respect 
for the law has a broad influence: both the individual and others who learn of his or her 
experience become less likely to obey the law in the future.  As a result, the job of the legal 
authorities becomes more difficult.  It is striking that even minor personal experiences with 
legal authorities—dealing with a fender-bender traffic accident, a burglary, or a street stop—
have a strong general influence on people’s views about the police and courts. 
TYLER & HUO, supra note 21, at 206. 
 170. See Tom R. Tyler, Racial Profiling, Attributions of Motive, and the Acceptance of Social 
Authority, in SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 61, 65 (Richard L. Wiener, et al. eds., 2007). 
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perceived fairness of the procedures.171 
Racial profiling violates the neutrality and consistency of the police as 
legal authorities, suggesting that they act instead in a biased fashion.172  
Aggressive police investigation tactics resulting from racially-profiled 
suspects’ defensive responses will be seen by those suspects as 
disrespectful treatment, hurtful to individual dignity, and demonstrating 
lack of respect for suspects’ rights.173  In an atmosphere in which police are 
expected to engage in racially-biased tactics, moreover, these negative 
perception-confirming police behaviors will lead their targets to believe that 
the police are thoroughly unconcerned with the targets’ welfare.174  
Additionally, these dynamics should occur both at the individual level, 
meaning the profiled individual’s feeling of abuse, and at the community 
level, meaning the broader racial group’s understanding that harm to one of 
their members is in some sense harm to all.175  Of course, it is the 
perception of racial profiling, more than its reality, that should trigger these 
cognitive and social processes.176  But reality and perception are often 
linked.177  Widespread racially-biased, aggressive police behavior is likely 
to increase the perception that it is occurring.178  That perception will, in 
turn, bring about the ill social impacts of greater crime and reduced police-
citizen cooperation discussed above.179  The selection, ratchet, and 
blindness effects should thus cumulatively contribute to negative procedural 
justice effects as well. 
What research that has been done specifically in the area of police 
racial profiling firmly supports these suggestions.  One study, for example, 
 
 171. See id. at 65. 
 172. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 94-128 (articulating extended defense of this point). 
 173. That such aggressive policing techniques will be used and poorly received, raising the 
risk of error, is the main point of Taslitz, supra note 1. 
 174. See TYLER & HUO, supra note 21, at 58-75 (analyzing the factors affecting subjects’ 
attributions of motive-based trust, including in the context of racial profiling, and the behavioral 
consequences of such attributions). 
 175. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 94-128 (documenting both individual and group reactions 
to racial profiling). 
 176. See Tyler, supra note 170, at 72 (“[P]olice cannot assume that eliminating the reality of 
profiling will [alone] eliminate the perception of profiling.”). 
 177. See id. at 67 (noting that experience with the police is an important factor affecting 
police-citizen procedural justice perceptions). 
 178. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 94-128. 
 179. See Tyler, supra note 170, at 64 (noting that “attributions of profiling are associated with 
decreased support,” reduce active public cooperation with the police, voluntary deference to 
police decisions, and “general everyday compliance with the law,” all factors affecting “the degree 
to which the police are able to control crime . . . .”); Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of 
Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support to Policing, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
513, 522-24 (2003) (articulating similar argument). 
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revealed that personal experiences with the police led racial minority group 
members to believe that they had been racially profiled.180  This belief leads 
subjects to be less willing to accept police decisions and to express more 
anger toward the police.181  Importantly, as repeated several times above, if 
the subjects expressed that anger toward the police, then the officers likely 
reacted aggressively, compounding those citizens’ perceptions of being 
disrespectfully treated.182  Interestingly, only two percent of the variance in 
perceptions of being racially-profiled could be attributed to the mere fact 
that subjects were members of potentially stigmatizable groups, thus seeing 
profiling because they expected to see it.183  By far the more important 
factor was the fairness of the procedures police used.184  Neutral, factual 
decisions and polite, respectful treatment reduced perceptions of being 
profiled, while opposite procedures increased such perceptions.185  A 
second study found similar results when minority group members perceived 
that the police generally used unfair procedures, such as profiling, rather 
than the members believing that they had personally been subjected to such 
profiling.186  Explains leading procedural justice researcher Tom Tyler, 
The core conclusion of the studies is that when people indicate that they 
have experienced fair procedures when dealing with the police and/or 
when they indicate that the police generally use fair procedures when 
dealing with members of their community, they are less likely to infer that 
profiling occurs.  Hence, the police can manage their relationships with 
members of the communities they serve through their behavior when 
dealing with members of the public.187 
The flip side, Tyler also notes, of course, is that police will have more 
difficulty “managing” their relationships with the communities they police 
when they are seen as using unfair procedures.188  The likely resulting 
increase in crime will occur in just the community that fears police abuse.189  
Because those communities are generally composed of racial minorities,190 
 
 180. Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, 
Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 260-62 (2004). 
 181. See Tyler, supra note 170, at 66. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49; Taslitz, supra note 1, at 129. 
 183. Tyler, supra note 170, at 66. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 66-67; see Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 180, at 268. 
 187. Tyler, supra note 170, at 67-68. 
 188. See id. at 68. 
 189. See supra text accompanying notes 164-93 (addressing when, how, and why negative 
procedural justice effects can affect crime rates in the involved communities). 
 190. See Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 179, at 523. 
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racial profiling, therefore, probably paradoxically increases criminal 
victimization of racial minorities.  These costs in turn harm the broader 
society, perhaps in the form of higher taxes, reduced social contributions by 
minority group members, or funds diverted from other valuable uses to 
policing.191  Moreover, increased crime in minority communities further 
contributes to the perceived association between race and criminality, 
further increasing profiling, and profiling, in turn, breeds greater minority 
citizen resentment, causing greater police aggression, ultimately causing a 
rise in the rates of error in arresting and convicting the innocent.192  Finally, 
even if error rates remain stable, the increase in crime, if it also results in 
corresponding increases in arrests, will raise the absolute number of arrests 
of the innocent, further compounding the problem.193 
E. The Bystander Effects 
By “bystander effects,” I mean those effects of profiling on the 
communities policed or on the broader society other than procedural justice 
effects.194  I distinguish these community impacts from the direct impact of 
profiling on specific individuals arrested or otherwise harmed by the 
deprivation of their liberty.195 
Here I stress three effects.  First, remember that the ratchet effect 
means that African-Americans, particularly from lower-income 
 
 191. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6-7 (2007) (noting 
the ill consequences of governing through crime, including the “vast reorienting of fiscal and 
administrative resources . . . aptly described as a transformation from ‘welfare state’ to ‘penal 
state[].’”). 
 192. See Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Racial Profiling as a Minority Issue, in SOCIAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS IN LEGAL DECISION MAKING: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 75, 80-81 
(Richard L. Wiener, et al. eds., 2007) (summarizing empirical research suggesting that profiling is 
strengthening the perceived link between Black faces and crime, a link apparently magnified in 
the police relative to layperson subjects); see also supra Part II.A-D (summarizing the selection, 
blinders, and ratchet effects that contribute to the cyclical process described here); Taslitz, supra 
note 1 (summarizing the same for police race/aggressive-tactics connections). 
 193. In other words, the selection and other effects described here result in ever more racially 
skewed policing efforts, causing aggressive police tactics that ensnare the innocent.  The more real 
or perceived overall crime, therefore, the more will be the total number of convictions of the 
innocent even if error rates remain constant.  But they may not remain constant, for great political 
pressure on the police to stem a perceived “crime wave” logically might create still more pressure 
on police to close cases “successfully,” further heightening police use of just those aggressive 
tactics that lead to mistakes. 
 194. The term “bystander effects” is mine, but the empirical realities underlying the concept 
have been well-documented.  See sources cited infra notes 194-215 and accompanying text. 
 195. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 94-99 (documenting racial profiling’s impact on 
individuals). 
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communities, are over-represented among the population of incarcerated 
felons.196  This over-representation can be so extreme in some localities as 
to devastate those communities.197  Once released, felons find diminished 
job opportunities because of the stigma of their conviction.198  They may 
accordingly invest less in “human capital,” in education and training, 
fearing that such investment will be fruitless.199  But this weakens each ex-
felon’s existing relationships, leading his relationship partners to depend 
upon him less, and leading others to be unwilling to form new relationships 
with him.200  Moreover, shattered relationships and poor employment 
opportunities may lead him to re-offend.201  Widespread imprisonment and 
unemployment can rend the “social fabric of the community,”202 fueling “a 
cycle of detrimental consequences for the community that then feed back on 
community members.”203  Fewer adults are around to supervise children, 
while the opportunity for the children to engage in crime rises.204  This 
combination in turn means more broken families and greater poverty.205  
Yet another feedback effect—the one with which I began the discussion of 
raced effects—is magnified by this community devastation: the association 
between crime and the black face206 raising the risk of wrongful 
convictions.207  As law professor Bernard Harcourt, relying partly on the 
work of fellow law professor Dorothy Roberts,208 explains: 
Roberts discusses one extremely revealing symptom of the “black face” of 
 
 196. See supra Part III.C. 
 197. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 191, 206 (1998) (detailing impact on ex-felons); CLEAR, supra note 101, at 574 
(detailing the resulting community devastation). 
 198. See PAGER, supra note 71, at 159 (“Across a wide range of occupations and industries, 
ex-offenders are systematically excluded from entry-level job openings on the basis of their 
criminal record.”). 
 199. See Meares, supra note 197, at 209. 
 200. See id. at 209. 
 201. See id. at 209-10; PAGER, supra note 71, at 160 (“Finding steady, quality employment is 
one of the strongest predictors of desistance from crime, and yet incarceration itself reduces the 
opportunities for ex-offenders to find work.  This vicious cycle suggests that current ‘crime 
control’ policies may in fact exacerbate the very conditions that lead to crime in the first place.”). 
 202. See HARCOURT, supra note 152, at 161. 
 203. Id. at 161. 
 204. See Meares, supra note 197, at 206-08. 
 205. See id. at 206 (noting the devastating effects of high incarceration levels on “the vitality 
of families, the life chances of children left behind, and the economic circumstances of African-
American communities.”). 
 206. See Herbert, supra note 56, at 99-108. 
 207. See Taslitz, supra note 1, at 130-33. 
 208. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 805 (1999). 
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crime, namely, the strong tendency of white victims and eyewitnesses to 
misidentify suspects in cross-racial situations.  Studies show a 
disproportionate rate of false identifications when the person identifying is 
white and the person identified is black.  In fact, according to Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, “this expectation is so strong that whites may observe an 
interracial scene in which a white person is the aggressor, yet remember 
the black person as the aggressor.”  The black face has become the 
criminal in our collective subconscious.  “The unconscious association 
between Blacks and crime is so powerful that it supersedes reality,” 
Roberts observes: “it predisposes whites to literally see Black people as 
criminals.  Their skin color marks Blacks as visibly lawless.209 
Second, my discussion above of the ratchet effect assumed that it had 
no effect on the actual relative offending rates of whites and blacks or the 
overall level of crime.  But this assumption is not necessarily correct.  If 
police divert more of their fixed resources to arresting blacks, and if whites 
know this, whites have less to fear from the police and so may offend more 
often.210  Racial profiling might, over time, mean that in fact a growing 
proportion of crime occurs among whites while police strategies are based 
on just the opposite premise.211  Furthermore, although deterrent effects of 
focused policing on black communities might reduce black crime, this does 
not mean it will fall as much as white crime rises.212  Indeed, procedural 
justice and other effects described above suggest that deterrence among the 
black community might be strongly moderated or even overcome by these 
other forces.213  In that case, overall crime further rises, again at least 
raising the absolute number of the wrongly convicted.214  Rising crime can 
lead to political pressure for even more energetic policing, which will be 
focused on black communities, leading them to bear the brunt of tactics that 
yet again risk prosecuting the innocent.215 
III. INFORMANTS AND RACE 
Having explained in Section II the five raced effects that can increase 
the chances of convicting the innocent, Section III applies those effects to 
the special case of informants.  Specifically, Section III examines the 
 
 209. HARCOURT, supra note 152, at 162 (quoting in part respectively Sheri Lynn-Johnson, 
Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 943, 949 (1984), and 
Roberts, supra note 208, at 806). 
 210. See HARCOURT, supra note 152, at 154-56. 
 211. See id. at 4, 154-60. 
 212. See id. at 154-60. 
 213. See supra Part II.A-D. 
 214. See supra Part II.A-D. 
 215. See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text. 
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available empirical and anecdotal evidence of whether any or all of these 
five effects are at work in the use of informants in crime investigation.  
Note that the focus is on using informants in investigating criminal activity.  
This section proposes that there is good reason to believe that racially-
biased errors in investigating crime based upon informants’ tips are likely to 
raise the risk of racially-biased errors in later convictions.  Moreover, other 
racially-biased costs will be imposed even upon those wrongly ensnared in 
the justice system, although never convicted, as well as upon broader racial 
communities. 
Although I try for ease of expression, to tease out each of the five raced 
effects separately, under distinct headings, I necessarily mention several or 
all of the effects under each heading as well.  I do so because these effects 
are interactive, often mutually reinforcing.  Analyzing any one effect in 
complete isolation from the others can thus sometimes understate each 
effect’s likely impact on wrongful convictions.  Moreover, the data does not 
always clearly separate effects.  Furthermore, I have more to say about 
some effects than others because there is more data about some effects than 
others.  Additionally, sometimes different kinds of data are available as to 
different effects.  My conclusions are thus made with some caution. 
It is also important to remember my definitions of “informants” and of 
their various sub-types, and my explanation of why I rely on informants as 
an example, which were set forth in this article’s introduction.216  Some of 
my comments here are directed more to one informant sub-type than 
another—for example, more to confidential informants involved in crime 
than to citizen-informants.  Other authors have made the powerful case that 
over-reliance on informants—regardless of the race of the persons fingered, 
and if done without adequate safeguards—raises undue risks of convicting 
the innocent.217  My primary purpose in this section, however, is to explore 
converging sources of data suggesting that this risk—and the risk of 
collateral community harms (bystander effects)—rises further with 
informants’ tips targeting racial minorities.  I begin by exploring empirical 
data concerning the selection, blinders, and ratchet effects where police rely 
on anonymous tips (which might be from “stoolies” or from ordinary 
citizens—we cannot tell which because of their anonymous nature) or 
confidential informants.  Next, I explore analogical research on rumor 
psychology, research having the most relevance to anonymous tips (from 
whatever source), though of some relevance to all types of informants’ tips.  
I finish my discussion of the informants’ example by examining a variety of 
 
 216. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35. 
 217. See supra text accompanying notes 28-34. 
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data sources—and the rise of the “Stop Snitching” protest movement—as 
offering insights into the procedural justice and bystander effects.  The Stop 
Snitching Movement was likely intended to protest against the use of 
confidential informants and cooperators, but police feared that the 
movement would instead intimidate honest but anonymous citizen-
informants or honest and potential testifying citizen-witnesses from coming 
forward to aid the police in the first place.218  My interest is less in who is 
right in this debate than in the community distrust of police fostered by their 
excessive reliance on informants, a distrust manifested in the anti-snitching 
protests. 
A. Selection, Blindness, and Ratchets 
1. Empirical Data 
a. Why Non-Testifying Informants Merit Separate Attention. 
The bulk of literature about informants and innocence focuses on 
wrongful convictions resulting in part from perjurious informant testimony, 
mostly by jailhouse snitches or cooperators.219  Indeed, dishonest informant-
witnesses are a contributing factor to convicting the innocent in a 
significant percentage of all DNA exonerations.220  In death cases in 
particular, this contribution is striking, with false snitch testimony being a 
leading cause of error.221  Although recent studies have suggested that there 
is significant racial disparity in likely wrongful convictions, little analysis 
has been separately conducted as to the role of race in causing error based 
primarily upon informant testimony.222  Whatever such additional data 
might reveal, were it available, about the degree to which racially-biased 
 
 218. See infra text accompanying notes 347-91. 
 219. See, e.g., Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of 
Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (1999); Clifford S. Zimmerman, 
From the Jailhouse to the Courthouse: The Role of Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in 
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 55 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. 
Humphrey eds., 2001). 
 220. See Zimmerman, supra note 219, at 56. 
 221. See JAILHOUSE SNITCH TESTIMONY, supra note 27, at 1; Brandon Garrett, Judging 
Innocence, 108 COLUMBIA L. REV. 55, 91-93 (2008). 
 222. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 221, at 129 (noting that the innocence exoneration cases in 
his study included significantly disproportionate minority representation, and if “DNA 
exonerations represent the tip of the iceberg, then the base of the iceberg may also 
disproportionately consist of minority convicts.”); Samuel Gross, et al., Exonerations in the 
United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 548 (2005) (noting racial 
disparities in certain categories of cases among the innocent wrongly convicted). 
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processes in snitch-witness-dependent cases contribute to convicting the 
innocent, it would likely underestimate the problem.  This is because 
anonymous informants (those whose identity is unknown to the police) and 
confidential informants (those whose identity the police know but will not 
reveal)—two types of informants who generally do not testify due to the 
desire for anonymity—may, consistent with the selection effect discussed in 
Part IIA above, either lie more often about crimes committed by racial 
minorities, or pass on information implicating racial minorities that police 
too readily believe.223  The other effects discussed in this article would then 
lead police to focus their resources in a racially-biased manner, ignoring 
alternative theories of who did the crime.224  That focus might, accordingly, 
make it more likely that innocent racial minorities will be convicted, or, if 
acquitted or otherwise released, will at least suffer the stigma, temporary 
loss of freedom, and financial cost of defending against a wrongful 
prosecution.225  The empirical data on non-testifying informants and race is 
almost as sparse, unfortunately, as it is for testifying snitches.  Nevertheless, 
what data is available, though presenting a mixed picture, raises cause for 
concern.226 
b. The (Admittedly Limited) Data on Non-Testifying Informants 
i. The Selection Effect 
The most interesting study done in this area was by the San Diego 
Search Warrant Project, led by Professor Laurence A. Benner, at California 
Western School of Law.227  The Project collected random samples of 
narcotics warrants issued in 1998 from the two largest districts, 100% of the 
samples from the two smaller districts that compose San Diego County, and 
conducted a random sample of the combined databases for the County as a 
whole.228  Information about the race of the targets was available in at least 
three-fourths of the cases.229 
 
 223. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 284 (1983) (defining “anonymous informant”); 
Laurence A. Benner, Racial Disparity in Narcotics Search Warrants, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 
183, 200 n.60 (2002) (defining “confidential informant”).  My speculation is that, if police 
generally focus their investigative resources more on racial minorities, then they will more often 
use particular investigative techniques, including informants, to convict racial minorities and will, 
because of the blinders effect, more often believe informants who finger racial minorities. 
 224. See supra Part II.A-D. 
 225. See supra Part II.A-D. 
 226. See Benner, supra note 223, at 184. 
 227. See id. at 183. 
 228. See id. at 185. 
 229. See id. at 185 n.17. 
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The police most frequently-targeted only three zip code areas in the 
most-frequently searched district, the San Diego Judicial District; each of 
these three areas respectively consisted of 88%, 95%, and 78% non-white 
populations and accounted for 44% of all narcotics warrants.230  The target 
of the search in these district zip codes was either African-American or 
Hispanic in 96% of the cases, even though the majority of the judicial 
district’s overall population in 1998—55%—was white.231  In the district as 
a whole, only about 20% of warrants targeted whites, while about 80% 
targeted racial minorities, yet Blacks and Hispanics together constituted 
only one-third of the district’s population.232  Asian-Americans, comprising 
13% of the population, were targeted in only one case.233 
These disparities were observed even though national data and San 
Diego-specific data suggest far higher percentages of total narcotics users 
being white than black, though each race may differ dramatically in the 
specific drug of choice.234  Blacks in San Diego are, for example, arguably 
more likely to use rock than powder cocaine, while the reverse is true for 
whites.235  Yet 88% of all cocaine warrants were for crack, with only 2% of 
such warrants being for the white-preferred powder.236  This targeting-
preference could result from police resources being disproportionately 
focused on black inner-city communities and from the greater ease of 
 
 230. See id. at 190. 
 231. See id. at 191. 
 232. See Benner, supra note 223, at 194. 
 233. See id. 
 234. See, e.g., OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 1998 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE 13 
(1999), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/NHSDAsumrpt.pdf (finding that 72% of 
all drug users were white, only 15% black); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes 
and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
296, 310 (2001) (reporting that Whites represented 82% of drug sellers during 1991-93, while 
blacks represented 16%); Benner, supra note 223, at 195-96 (discussing San Diego data showing 
Whites far more likely than Blacks or Hispanics to be engaged in manufacturing, distributing, and 
using methamphetamine). 
 235. See Benner, supra note 223, at 195-96.  I say “arguably” because the study Benner relied 
on drew its data from cocaine testing of arrestees, a population that may not necessarily 
accurately reflect the population of users.  See id. at 195-96.  Furthermore, although crack has 
often been labeled the “Black” drug of choice, there is data suggesting that in fact Whites may 
make up 65% of those reporting crack use in their lifetimes, with African-Americans and 
Hispanics constituting respectively 26% and 9% of the users.  See DORIS MARIE PROVINE, 
UNEQUAL UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 127, 129 (2007).  But see Benner, supra 
note 223, at 197-98 (reporting data showing that 214,000 Blacks but only 147,000 Whites had 
recently used rock cocaine, while 1.1 million Whites used some form of cocaine recently, and that 
of the 18.5 million Whites who have tried cocaine at some point in their lives, only 2.8 million of 
them used crack). 
 236. See Benner, supra note 223, at 197. 
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catching crack users in those areas because they are more likely to use the 
drug in public areas than is the case with white users of powder cocaine.237  
Racial profiling in auto stops might also make more information available 
to the police about racial minorities because racial segregation patterns 
suggest that blacks are more likely to know, or know about, other blacks 
than about whites.238  Perhaps racially-profiled drivers found to be in 
possession of illegal narcotics at some level recognize that police are more 
likely to see fingering racial minorities as drug users and sellers as more 
credible than pointing to their white counterparts.239 
Inner-city warrant searches are also more likely to rely on confidential 
informants, who were involved in 80% of the searches in such areas.240  
Thirty-six percent of the searches in the three highly-targeted inner-city zip 
codes noted above were initiated by anonymous tips.241  There is reason to 
believe that many of the confidential informants’ tips are from drug users 
caught in the act and seeking police incentives in exchange for information, 
the sort of deal often condemned by commentators as likely to produce 
false tips free of the fear of discovery via cross-examination precisely 
because the informant’s identity is kept “confidential.”242 
What is particularly striking along these lines indeed is that only 36% 
of the warrants targeting Hispanics and 28% of those targeting blacks 
proved successful, while over half the warrants targeting whites uncovered 
drugs.243  This observation should direct police resources toward white 
suspects as a more efficient target for maximizing the success of searches, 
yet the bulk of police search activity is instead directed toward black 
neighborhoods, argues Benner.244 
 
 237. See id. at 200.  For the contention that crack transactions occur more frequently in public 
and attract greater police attention than cocaine powder use, see W. Rees Davis & Bruce D. 
Johnson, Criminal Justice Contacts of Users & Sellers of Hard Drugs in Harlem, 63 ALB. L. REV. 
877, 918 (2000). 
 238. See Benner, supra note 223, at 201 (relying on San Diego Vehicle Stop Study finding a 1 
in 4 chance for Black or Hispanic drivers being stopped by the police, but only 1 in 10 chance for 
White drivers); HARRIS, supra note 45, at 102 (analyzing connection between racial profiling and 
racially segregated housing patterns); cf. Benner, supra note 223, at 201 (“Because every racial 
group has drug users and sellers among them, if Blacks and Hispanics are stopped on the street 
disproportionately to their percentage of the population, this could be expected to produce a 
disproportionate number of Black and Hispanic informants.”). 
 239. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11 (explaining why police are more likely to 
believe claims of black over white criminality). 
 240. See Benner, supra note 223, at 200. 
 241. See id. 
 242. See id. (concerning incentives); Donna Coker, Foreward: Addressing the Real World of 
Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 837 (2003). 
 243. See Benner, supra note 223, at 199. 
 244. See id. at 203. 
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ii. The Blinders Effect 
a. The Basic Case 
An additional way to interpret this data, however, is that tips were more 
likely to be wrong—false or mistaken—when implicating blacks than when 
implicating whites, yet police are disproportionately likely to credit the 
latter tips.245  Benner has made a similar point in analyzing the project’s 
data.  “Another factor influencing the [low search] success rate,” said 
Benner, “may also be the reliability of information provided by anonymous 
tipsters and confidential informants.”246  “For example, with respect to the 
warrants issued in the three most frequently searched inner-city zip code 
areas, only around one in four (27%) of the warrants that were initiated by 
an anonymous tip was ultimately successful in finding its target.  All of 
these unsuccessful searches sought cocaine.”247  Police’s greater willingness 
to believe more unreliable information targeting racial minorities than 
information targeting whites suggests that the blinders effect is at work. 
These police failures, even if they do not result in prosecutions or 
convictions, do humiliate innocent persons, a form of bystander effect, and 
may contribute to the procedural justice and other feedback effects that can 
increase crime and decrease community safety.248  Moreover, such high 
failure rates at least raise suspicions about the truthfulness of race-targeted 
tips that do produce results: was the evidence planted?  Did it result from 
entrapment?249  The data do not answer these questions, but the data do 
suggest that these inquiries are not merely speculative and require further 
research.250 
 
 245. See e-mail from Laurence A. Benner, Professor of Law, California Western School of 
Law, to Andrew E. Taslitz, Welsh S. White Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University 
of Pittsburgh School of Law (February 4, 2008, 10:23 PST) (on file with Southwestern University 
Law Review) [hereinafter Benner, e-mail] (expressing agreement with my alternative 
interpretation of his data).  In particular Benner had this to say about my interpretation: 
Of course, as you know, empirical evidence showing such [racial] disparity cannot “prove” 
that this was the result of subconscious racism, but in light of the fact that (1) there are (in 
absolute numbers) more white drug users than non-white users and (2) warrants were more 
successful if served against whites than non-whites (even when controlling for the type of 
drug) the data supports the hypothesis that probable cause is a less rigorous standard when 
applied to non-white targets. 
Id. 
 246. See Benner, supra note 223, at 203. 
 247. Id. at 203. 
 248. See HARRIS, supra note 45, at 91-99 (discussing racial profiling humiliating the 
innocent). 
 249. See Zimmerman, supra note 219, at 62-67 (discussing instances of police fabrication of 
informants and informants’ fabrication of evidence). 
 250. See supra text accompanying notes 227-47. 
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Data from the other districts studied varies in its detail but does not 
undermine the results just described for the largest of the four districts 
studied.251  Likewise, the combined sample for San Diego County as a 
whole supports similar conclusions.252  Although under a quarter of the 
County’s population was Hispanic and only 6% black, they were 
respectively 43% and 20% of search warrant targets and 96% of crack 
cocaine targets.253  Furthermore, only 58% of all narcotics warrants 
uncovered the targeted drug, with a 69% success rate for white targets.254  
Less than half the Hispanic-targeted warrants and less than one-third of the 
Black-targeted warrants succeeded.255  Even controlling for the effect of the 
different drugs largely targeted in each group, “White targets continue to be 
more successful than warrants for either Hispanic or Black targets,” 
suggesting that “there is something about White suspects, or about the 
search warrant process when dealing with White suspects, that leads to 
higher success rates.”256  That particular something may in part be that 
anonymous tips alone (not counting confidential informants) were the 
source of probable cause in 35% of Black-targeted warrants and 19% of 
Hispanic-targeted ones but in only 8% of White-focused warrants.257 
b. Why Current Safeguards Likely Fail 
There may sometimes, it must be noted, be safeguards that can 
minimize the risks from potentially false or mistaken tips.  In a preliminary 
study of data concerning police practices in 1998, a study published in 
2000, focusing on a sample of narcotics warrants issued in the San Diego 
Judicial District, Benner found that police rarely relied solely on 
confidential informants or anonymous tips, instead corroborating them by 
subsequent controlled buys (often done by the confidential informants) in 
66% of all search warrant applications, or corroborating the tips by 
surveillance of the suspect premises and background investigation of its 
residents, making a total of 80% of the tip-based cases having some sort of 
additional corroboration.258  Yet these observations do not eliminate cause 
 
 251. See Benner, supra note 223, at 207-19. 
 252. See id. at 222-24. 
 253. See id. at 215-16. 
 254. See id. at 219-20. 
 255. See id. at 219-20. 
 256. Id. at 221. 
 257. See id. at 221. 
 258. See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: 
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REV. 221, 243-
45 (2000).  This preliminary study dealt with the center city judicial district, while Benner’s later 
study, summarized earlier in this section, examined four different judicial districts first separately, 
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for concern.  First, that still leaves 20% of confidential-informant or 
anonymous-tip-dependent cases without corroboration.259  Second, the 
preliminary study does not include a key point that the later study does—
the high failure rate of searches of racial minorities, suggesting that, despite 
the corroboration efforts reported in the preliminary study, informants 
targeting racial minorities have more risk of being untrustworthy.260  Third, 
as Benner notes, San Diego police, as of 1998, were considered among the 
most progressive in the country, with one of the strongest commitments to 
combating racial profiling.261  Unreliable racial-minority-targeting 
informants may prove to be of far greater concern in other areas.  Notably, a 
National Center for State Courts nationwide study found that no efforts 
whatsoever were made to corroborate the accuracy of confidential 
informants’ tips in fully 30% of cases.262  Fourth, the preliminary study did 
not parse out the precise percentage of controlled buys done by police 
versus by confidential informants but did describe the latter’s efforts in a 
way that permits the informant to be outside police observation during the 
alleged “buy” itself, raising the risk that the report of a buy is phony, 
though police did make efforts to reduce that risk.263  Fifth, there is also a 
risk that police will lie about such corroboration or even about the existence 
of the purported informant, as has been documented by others in a number 
of high-profile cases.264  This risk may be amplified in areas like the San 
Diego Judicial District where the officer signing the affidavit swears under 
oath to what the informant said but has not himself spoken to the informant, 
instead relying on the word of another officer never placed under oath.265  
Benner worries that this procedure is inconsistent with the spirit of the 
Fourth Amendment’s oath requirement and cautions, “While we do not 
mean to suggest that law enforcement officers are making up fictitious CIs 
and insulating the search warrant affiant from possible perjury charges by 
this practice, the potential for such abuse is apparent.”266  Requiring the 
officer purporting to have personal knowledge to sign the affidavit “would 
at least insure that the search warrant process is not based upon blind 
 
then using a random sample from the combined databases for the county as a whole.  See Benner, 
e-mail, supra note 245. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See supra text accompanying notes 243-47. 
 261. See Benner & Samarkos, supra note 258, at 236. 
 262. See id. at 243-44; RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL SUTTON & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, 
THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 34 tbl.16 (1985). 
 263. See Benner & Samarkos, supra note 258, at 243-44, 243 n.56. 
 264. See Zimmerman, supra note 219, at 62-65. 
 265. See Benner & Samarkos, supra note 258, at 241. 
 266. Id. at 241 (emphasis added). 
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trust.”267 
c. Current Probable Cause Conceptions Likely Fail 
Officer deception or intentional discrimination is not necessary, 
however, for there to be a racial bias problem for the innocent raised by 
police use of confidential informants or anonymous tipsters.268  Police and 
judges are subject to the same subconscious biases as the rest of us.269  That 
means that, in practice, such biases alter the meaning of probable cause 
based upon the individual officer’s or judge’s preconceptions.  As Benner 
again explains: 
The standard of probable cause, which shields the citizen from 
unwarranted governmental intrusions, is an elusive concept that in practice 
(if not in legal theory) is quite subjective.  As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated, the concept of probable cause cannot be reduced to a 
neat set of legal rules.  Instead it is based upon a common sense judgment, 
looking at the totality of the circumstances.  Because race is part of that 
totality, do perceptions about race unconsciously color that determination 
and make probable cause appear more readily when the suspect is 
Hispanic or Black and lives in a high crime area?  Statistical disparity 
standing alone, of course, does not establish unconstitutional 
discrimination, and indeed we do not contend or mean to imply that 
intentional discrimination is at work here.  However, would it not be 
surprising to find that the police, who wear the same cultural glasses as the 
rest of us, are immune from their distorting influence?  The locations the 
police choose to patrol and what drugs they choose to target are largely a 
function of where they perceive the work is.  Those decisions are not made 
in isolation from the totality of our cultural beliefs, stereotypes, and 
perceptions.  Therefore, any effort to understand this aspect of our 
criminal justice system will necessarily be incomplete until we begin to 
consider the implications of the pervasive yet subtle influence of race.270 
Benner’s 1998 study did arise after Illinois v. Gates,271 in which the 
United States Supreme Court established a more flexible, deferential test for 
 
 267. Id. at 241. 
 268. See generally K. Hugenberg & G.V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice 
and the Perception of a Facial Threat, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 640 (2003). 
 269. Id.; see also Cass R. Sustein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 969-72 
(2006) (arguing ample evidence shows widespread “implicit” or subconscious racial bias, with 
strong reason to believe that bias affects behavior); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 93 
(2008) (arguing that emotions, ideologies, intuitions, preconceptions, peer pressure, personality, 
upbringing, and education are among the factors having a subconscious influence on judicial 
decisionmaking in these areas of law where ambiguity creates significant judicial discretion). 
 270. Benner, supra note 223, at 223-24. 
 271. 462 U.S. at 238. 
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probable cause based upon informants’ tips than the Aguilar-Spinelli272 test 
that previously governed.  But there may be reason to believe that 
subsequent case law has further increased police and judicial discretion in 
the probable cause determination,273 and, as numerous scholars have 
documented, whenever governmental actors’ discretion increases, so does 
the room for the play of subconscious racial biases.274  For this reason too, 
the problem today may be worse than in 1998. 
iii. Speculating About Ratchets and Summary 
Benner’s studies are too few and leave too many unanswered questions 
to reach any firm conclusions.275  Moreover, some of his data, such as the 
police reports of corroborating drug buys, can be interpreted in a less 
skeptical fashion than suggested here.276  But his findings at least make 
plausible the worry that police use of informants reveals a selection effect 
in which police disproportionately focus overly aggressive investigative 
resources on minority communities, are insufficiently skeptical of tipsters, 
and remain blind to alternative theories of who are the guilty parties.277  
Likewise, the sometimes dramatic racial disparities in warrant enforcement 
raise the suspicion that the ratchet principle, in which ever-increasing 
percentages of resources target minority communities over time, is at 
work.278  More research is needed, but empirical and theoretical work not 
precisely focused on criminal informants but in an analogous area of 
psychological research—the study of rumors—adds still more reason to be 
concerned.279  The rumor analogy is particularly helpful in understanding 
 
 272. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
 273. See TASLITZ ET AL., supra note 27, at 189-95 (summarizing post-Gates case law arguably 
lowering the quantitative and qualitative standards for probable cause). 
 274. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Blindsight: The Absurdity of Color-Blind Criminal Justice, 
5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 14 (2007). 
 275. See infra note 279. 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 262-67. 
 277. See supra text accompanying notes 227-47. 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 239-47. 
 279. I want to stress that my argument is that Benner’s studies raise serious concerns about 
racial bias in the informant-use process but not that these few studies prove the point.  Not only is 
more data needed, but there are complexities in Benner’s data that make drawing clear lessons 
difficult.  For example, the relatively low success rates of warrants executed may be due to delay 
in executing them, earlier-executed warrants proving more successful.  See Benner & Samarkos, 
supra note 258, at 258-60.  Yet it seems odd that if delay is a primary contributor to weak success 
rates that the lowest success rates were nevertheless distributed in a racially-skewed manner.  
Moreover, Benner found that 29% of the warrants were issued based upon boilerplate language 
that rarely revealed prior tips by confidential informants; those that did mention tips noted only 
that they led to arrests, none mentioning whether any convictions resulted; and that warrant 
affidavits routinely omitted the circumstances surrounding the informant that suggest he is 
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the potential risks of relying on anonymous informants but enhances 
understanding of most other uses of informants’ tips as well.  The simple 
idea is that relying on tips from persons whose identity is unknown—or 
even on tips from a known informant who himself purportedly obtained his 
information from one or more unidentified third parties—creates risks much 
like those in rumor transmission.  But just as racial factors can make the 
dangers inherent in many rumors under-appreciated, making audiences 
unduly credulous about those rumors, so can anonymous tips and their 
cousins lead to similar outcomes.  Finally, it should be noted, the rumor 
analogy discussion here is directed primarily at the selection and blinders 
effects, though it has implications for the ratchet effect as well. 
2. The Rumor Analogy 
a. Defining Terms 
Rumors can be defined as unverified statements communicated among 
persons for instrumentally relevant purposes, that is, to achieve certain 
goals.280  Rumors help the involved persons to make sense of an ambiguous, 
uncertain world and to manage the risks of acting in such a world.281  To 
say that a rumor is “unverified” does not mean that it has no basis in 
reality—it often does—but does mean that it is not yet supported by 
evidence that has survived careful scrutiny and testing, coming from a 
probably credible source and confirming the claims made.282  Rumors are a 
species of “meme-transmission,” ideas that survive and propagate or die via 
a process of natural cultural selection.283  Gossip differs from rumor in that 
 
credible and has a trustworthy basis for his tip.  See id. at 236-42.  Instead, affidavits often rely on 
conclusory statements based upon the officer’s experience.  See id. at 239-40.  Judicial willingness 
in practice to defer to such statements in effect gives the police substantial and barely reviewed 
discretion in deciding whether there is probable cause, discretion allowing for just the sort of room 
for the play of subconscious racial biases that psychological theory and data predict.  More 
importantly, I argue that converging sources of data—Benner’s findings, research on rumor 
accuracy, anecdote, and the general theory of raced effects (which is rooted in empirical data and 
well-accepted psychological theory)—raise such a degree of concern about race raising the risk of 
convicting the innocent that opponents of that view bear the burden of persuasion for proving 
themselves right and that, absent their meeting such a burden, caution counsels taking whatever 
steps follow from the available data to reduce the risk of error. 
 280. See NICHOLAS DIFONZO & PRASHANT BORDIA, RUMOR PSYCHOLOGY: SOCIAL AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACHES 13-18, 229-30 (2007). 
 281. See id. at 13-15, 229-30. 
 282. See id. at 17-18, 229-30. 
 283. See id. at 16.  For a more thorough discussion of memes and their role in legal reasoning, 
see Andrew E. Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the Subconscious in Date Rape and 
Other Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145, 183-84 (2007). 
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gossip is less about the usefulness of the information in attaining certain 
goals than it is about building group solidarity and intimacy and enforcing 
group norms.284  Gossip usually concerns more personal and yet less 
weighty matters than does rumor,285 yet there are nebulous forms of hearsay 
that are hard to classify as one or another type, displaying overlapping 
features of both.286  Rumor and gossip can both spread either by serial 
transmission—one person telling another, usually with little discussion or 
deliberation—or collaboratively, by group conversation.287 
b. Why Rumor Research Sheds Light on Informant’s Tips 
Informants’ tips, while not identical to rumor, can profitably be 
analogized to the latter.  A search warrant affiant, remember, usually gets 
his information about the tip from another officer, who in turn received the 
original tip.288  The tipster himself may be reporting what he purports to 
have personally seen or what someone else has told him or what he has 
heard from scuttlebutt in the neighborhood, a process of serial transmission 
similar to much of the rumor-transmission process.289  The tip 
communicates information with the hope that it will be treated as true, often 
to achieve a variety of instrumental goals, such as a reward or deal for the 
tipster and recognition for the officer who thereby catches the bad guy, 
rumors also often having instrumental goals, albeit different ones.290  The 
tip is designed to address ambiguity or uncertainty about whether a crime 
occurred or who did it and to deal with the threat to the community from 
criminals roaming free, two functions similar to those served by rumor as 
 
 284. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 14 tbl.1.1, 19-23, 230. 
 285. See id. at 14 tbl.1.1, 21-22. 
 286. See id. at 23. 
 287. See id. at 137-38.  I am using DiFonzo and Bordia’s terminology because I believe the 
terminology and their model to be the most useful for my illustrative purposes, but I do not want 
to leave the impression that the meaning of these terms or their significance are not contested.  
They often are.  See, e.g., GOOD GOSSIP (Robert F. Goodman & Aaron Ben-Ze’ev eds., 1994)) 
(collecting essays debating the meaning and social significance of “gossip”); RALPH P. ROSNOW 
& GARY ALAN FINE, RUMOR AND GOSSIP: THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HEARSAY 4-7 (1976) 
(defining rumor and gossip similarly to how DiFonzo and Bordia have done and distinguishing 
them based upon the motives for their respective uses but otherwise emphasizing the similarities 
of their social functions as species of “hearsay” rather than their differences). 
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 258-65 (describing the nature of search warrants and 
the process for obtaining them); see generally Michael Longyear, Note, To Attach Or Not to 
Attach: The Continued Confusion Regarding Search Warrants and the Incorporation of 
Supporting Documents, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 387, 399-401 (2007).  The assertions made in this 
paragraph of the text above about the similarities between rumor and informants’ tips are all 
developed  Infra text accompanying notes 284-321. 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 239-47. 
 290. See supra note 242 and accompanying text. 
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well.291  Although a tip may be believed, it is usually at first unconfirmed, 
coming from questionable sources or those about whom little is known, 
rumors likewise starting in similarly worrisome circumstances.292  As 
mentioned earlier, often tips are acted upon in the absence of any 
corroboration whatsoever, and this too is true of rumor.293  Tips, like 
rumors, raise a particularly important set of questions: When are they most 
likely to be accurate and when are they most likely to be believed (whether 
accurate or not)?  In the case of rumor, an entire branch of psychology is 
devoted to studying these questions.294 
c. Causes of Error 
i. Selective Inattention and Stereotype-Congruent Interpretation 
Rumor research in psychology has revealed a number of particularly 
relevant findings concerning rumor (and, therefore, perhaps tip) accuracy.295  
Rumor accuracy may be altered by witnesses’ selectively attending to 
certain information over other data to accord with cognitive biases, such as 
stereotypes and schemas.296  This filtering of information is then interpreted 
in ways that are consistent with those stereotypes, ignoring other equally or 
more plausible interpretations.297  Racial stereotypes, of course, can have a 
particularly powerful grip on these processes of evidence-gathering and 
analysis.298  Stereotypes applied to an individual circumstance raise 
notoriously significant risks of error.299 
 
 291. See supra text accompanying notes 239-247. 
 292. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
 294. See sources cited supra notes 258-65. 
 295. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280 at 165-69. 
 296. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280 at 161 tbl.7.1, 164. 
 297. See id. at 161 tbl.7.1, 164-65.  For a more detailed analysis of these “epistemological 
filters” and related cognitive processes affecting what data we attend to and how much weight we 
give them, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the 
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 410-19, 418 n.204, 419 n.209 (1996). 
 298. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 164; see generally P.A. TURNER, I HEARD 
IT THROUGH THE GRAPEVINE: RUMOR IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN CULTURE (1993); see generally 
D.R. Maines, Information Pools and Racialized Narrative Structures, 40 THE SOCIOLOGICAL 
QUARTERLY 317 (1999); see generally Y. Trope & A. Liberman, Social Hypothesis Testing: 
Cognitive and Motivational Mechanisms, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC 
PRINCIPLES 239 (E.T. Higgins & A.W. Kruglianski eds., 1996); see generally Y. Trope & E.P. 
Thompson, Looking for Truth in All the Wrong Places? Assymetric Search of Individuating 
Information About Stereotyped Group Members, 73 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 229 
(1997). 
 299. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 164-65. 
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These same perceptual biases can thus lead to an initial hypothesis 
about guilt being based on the stereotype.  But, apart from the effect of the 
stereotypes themselves, there is another force at work: the biasing effect of 
having formed an initial hypothesis at all, for, once made, we tend to look 
for, perceive, pay attention to, and favorably interpret evidence supporting 
that hypothesis while unduly discounting contradicting evidence.300  Indeed, 
we will often so readily find convincing confirming evidence that we 
prematurely cease evidence gathering entirely.301  Furthermore, 
symbolization may occur in which stereotypes end in the selection of a 
scapegoat, focusing tensions and bringing the virtue of simplicity to 
understanding a complex situation.302 
Rumor transmitters also implicitly recognize that only certain sorts of 
information will be readily processed by a particular audience as 
“understandable, plausible, and acceptable to the hearer.”303  Stereotype-
inconsistent details may interfere with this goal and thus be dropped in 
favor of a tidier story, skewing evidence-transmission away from 
accuracy.304  Rumor content is also likely to favor messages derogating 
outgroups as a way for enhancing ingroup prestige.305  “A rumor sketching 
a negative characterization of them makes us feel better about we—and, by 
extension, me.”306  Even out-group members in certain circumstances can 
buy into out-group-derogating stereotypes.307  High individual and 
collective anxiety can intensify these other effects by making hearers more 
suggestible and dulling their critical faculties,308 such anxiety often 
accompanying police work.309  Group conformity pressures to fall in line 
with an evolving group consensus—one that may be promoted by 
stereotyping—can also pressure otherwise skeptical listeners to accept 
flawed messages.310  Groups also vary in their “epistemic norms”—the 
 
 300. See id. at 164; Trope & Liberman, supra note 298. 
 301. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 164-65. 
 302. See id. at 164; R.H. TURNER & L. M. KILLIAN, COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR 47-48 (2nd ed. 
1972) (first articulating fully the “symbolization” concept). 
 303. DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 167. 
 304. See id. at 167; JANET B. RUSCHER, PREJUDICED COMMUNICATION: A SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 68 (2001) (articulating “tidy story” idea). 
 305. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 169. 
 306. Id. at 169. 
 307. See, e.g., William T. Pizzi et al., Discrimination in Sentencing on the Basis of Afrocentric 
Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327, 350 (2005). 
 308. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 170. 
 309. See, e.g., VINCENT E. HENRY, DEATH WORK: POLICE, TRAUMA, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF SURVIVAL 3-13 (2004); PHILIP BONIFACIO, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF POLICE WORK: 
A PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH 93-125 (1991). 
 310. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 173. 
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standards of proof they require for certain kinds of facts311—and such 
norms may be lowered or more easily met by stereotype-congruent 
information.312 
ii. Inability to Verify and Illusory Correlations 
Inaccuracy is also more likely where, as with most tips, serial 
transmission rather than group deliberation is the means for rumor-
dissemination.313  The inability independently to verify information or the 
high cost of doing so; urgency to act before verifying; lack of firm, largely 
indisputable information; and the difficulty of access to more credible 
sources314—factors likely common in police use of informants315—also 
make inaccuracy more likely.  Furthermore, where the motive or ability to 
verify information is weak, time passage compounds inaccuracy.316  The 
individual and collective need to make sense of the world can also lead 
observers to see illusory associations, non-existent connections between 
independent actions.317  Such illusions tend to be consistent with cultural 
stereotypes.318  Additionally, observers will tend to rely on character 
assessments to explain behavior and categorize it, ignoring base rates (how 
most in the relevant population behave), and thus, character assessments 
may again reflect stereotypes about the fundamental nature of outgroup 
members.319 
 
 311. See id. at 174. 
 312. See Taslitz, supra note 237, at 410-19 (illustrating similar process at work in the context 
of the credibility of alleged sexual assault victims); Andrew E. Taslitz, Abuse Excuses and the 
Logic and Politics of Expert Relevance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1056-63 (1998) (exploring the 
political component affecting epistemic judgments of criminal culpability). 
 313. See supra pp. 82-83; see e.g., DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 171. 
 314. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 171-72. 
 315. Clifford S. Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and 
Suggestions For Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 81, 83-85, 143-46 (1994). 
 316. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 173.  DiFonzo and Bordia define two types 
of accuracy “verity” (closeness to the real world) and precision (closeness of a later rumor to an 
earlier version).  See, id. at 142.  I have not bothered to distinguish in text between these two 
notions.  Although verity is of greater concern in criminal justice, lack of precision, in the real 
world decision whether to rely on an informant as a source of rumor, raises substantial doubts 
about verity as well. 
 317. See id. at 118-19. 
 318. See id. at 119. 
 319. See id.  Such assessments of character based upon race can have important effects in 
choosing the right liability rules in the substantive criminal law.  See Andrew E. Taslitz, 
Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crimes Legislation are Wrong, 40 
B.C.L. REV. 739, 744-45, 758 (1999). 
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d. Why Rumor Audiences (and Police) are Unduly Credulous 
Many of the same forces that lead to rumor inaccuracy, however, also 
promote belief in the rumor’s truth.320  Rumors that are consistent with pre-
existing attitudes, including toward racial group members, are more likely 
to be believed.321  For example, rumors about black criminality, stupidity, 
and sexual aggression are more readily accepted by white audiences than 
the converse.322  In the mid 1960s, a rumor circulated in Detroit, Michigan, 
falsely alleging that a child was castrated by a gang of teenage boys in a 
shopping mall restroom.  “When repeated in the White community, the 
gang was said to be Black and the victim White.  When told in the Black 
community, the gang was said to be White and the victim Black.”323 
Rumor-repetition also increases its acceptance.  The mere re-telling of 
a similar story can thus encourage its spread, particularly if not rebutted by 
equally credible sources.324  Likewise, the various other biases recounted 
above that degrade rumor accuracy in the telling—information-filters, 
confirmation biases, in-group aggrandizement, among others—probably 
promote acceptance and repetition of stereotype-consistent rumors.325 
In any given instance, of course, a variety of forces can be at work, 
some promoting rumor accuracy, others undermining it.  But what this 
review of illustrative factors encouraging the latter does is to point out how 
racial stereotyping can raise the risk of inaccurate rumors being believed, 
particularly under certain conditions.326  If the rumor-tipster analogy holds, 
then informants’ tips playing into racial biases will raise this very same 
risk.327  But, as I will briefly mention in this article’s conclusion, the 
analogy also suggests potential remedies for reducing this risk by gaining 
control over at least some of the conditions, such as the absence of rebuttal 
evidence and skeptical criticism, that promote it.328 
 
B. Procedural Justice and the Bystander Effect: The Stop-Snitching 
 
 320. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 90. 
 321. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 92-93. 
 322. See id. at 94.  But see GARY ALAN FINE & PATRICIA A. TURNER, WHISPERS ON THE 
COLOR LINE: RUMOR AND RACE IN AMERICA 126-27 (2001) (analysis of the credibility among 
the African-American community of rumors, often about white anti-black conspiracies). 
 323. DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 96; see Marilynn Rosenthal, Where Rumor 
Raged, TRANS-ACTION February 1971, at 34, 36. 
 324. See DIFONZO & BORDIA, supra note 280, at 101-03, 111. 
 325. See, id. at 111. 
 326. See supra pp. 84-86; see Rosenthal, supra note 323, at 34. 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 288-96. 
 328. See infra text accompanying note 398. 
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Movement 
1. Bystander Effects 
a. Increasing Crime 
Professor Alexandra Natapoff has written extensively about the 
negative impact of widespread snitching on poorer, inner-city, often 
African-American communities.329  Natapoff offers this scenario of a 
“typical” use of drug informants in actual cases: 
Drew, a low-level drug dealer who is also an addict, is confronted by 
[federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)] agents and local police on his 
way to make a deal.  They offer to refrain from pressing charges at that 
moment in exchange for information and the active pursuit of new 
suspects.  Drew agrees, immediately provides the name of one of his 
suppliers to whom he owes money, and is released.  As an informant, 
Drew’s investigative activities require him to meet with his police officer 
handler every two weeks to provide information and make a controlled 
buy every month or so.  In the meantime, with his handler’s knowledge, 
Drew continues to consume drugs and carries a gun illegally.  
Unbeknownst to (but suspected by) his handler, he skims drugs from his 
controlled buys and continues to deal drugs on the side.  In the course of 
his cooperation he also provides the police with truthful incriminating 
information about a competing drug dealer, his landlord to whom he owes 
rent, and his girlfriend’s ex-boyfriend whom he dislikes.  The police arrest 
all three.  When Drew is arrested in another jurisdiction for simple drug 
possession, his handler calls the prosecutor and those charges are 
dropped.330 
Drew’s story illustrates a number of the community or “bystander” 
harms caused by an informant culture.  Drew continues to engage in crime, 
some of it at his handler’s urging (controlled buys), other crimes with the 
handler’s tolerance or willful blindness.  Drew escapes prosecution for his 
crimes not only by law enforcement’s looking the other way, but by its 
active protection, as shown by the prosecutor’s efforts to get Drew released 
and get the charges dropped when he was arrested in another jurisdiction.  
Drew does help to prevent crimes by turning in other dealers, but he does so 
as a way to incapacitate his competitors, avoid his creditors, and fulfill his 
 
 329. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004) [hereinafter Natapoff, Snitching]; Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond 
Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107-
09 (2006). 
 330. Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 647. 
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personal vendettas.  Moreover, the dealers he fingers seem to be low-level 
drug dealers, easily replaced, rather than the high level dealers in charge of 
major distribution schemes.  There is insufficient data to judge whether 
Drew commits more crimes than he prevents, but there is reason to worry 
that he does, partly because he is reaching only low-level dealers, partly 
because there are so many Drew-counterparts that their cumulative 
contribution to criminal activity is substantial, and partly because the 
resulting likely procedural justice effects erode the willingness to obey the 
law in the community more generally.331 
Drug informants are, moreover, not the only sort, for “snitching can 
reduce or eliminate liability for crimes as diverse as kidnapping, arson, 
gambling, and murder.”332  Indeed, explains Natapoff, “there is no reason to 
assume that a given informant, even if he is useful to law enforcement in a 
particular case, is producing a net benefit to his community,” for “he may 
be a neighborhood scourge, a source of violence and fear, and a bad 
influence on local youth, fueled by his personal knowledge that as long as 
he remains useful to the authorities, his collateral bad behavior will remain 
essentially unchecked.”333 
b. Fostering a Culture of Distrust 
The many Drews in poor inner-city neighborhoods do more than 
potentially add to the total quantity of serious crime in the area.  These 
communities are often already wounded by a hyper-active criminal justice 
system resulting in most community members being related to or friends 
with someone who is incarcerated, parentless, drug-addicted, unemployed, 
or depressed.334  High unemployment and substandard housing means that 
people spend more time on the streets, making it easier for police to arrest 
or hassle them335 or for undercover narcotics officers to “penetrate networks 
of friends and acquaintances . . . .”336  This limited privacy and the fluid, 
 
 331. See id. at 647-48 (offering similar analysis of the Drew example, albeit without referring 
to the procedural justice effects discussed earlier in this article). 
 332. See id. at 653; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 435 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen Maguire eds., 2001) (showing over 20% federal 
cooperation rates for kidnapping, bribery, money laundering, racketeering, antitrust, gambling, 
arson, and national defense offenses). 
 333. Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 661. 
 334. See id. at 685-86; Carol S. Aneshensel & Clea A. Sucoff, The Neighborhood Context of 
Adolescent Mental Health, 37 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEH. 293-94 (1996) (describing ill mental health 
effects from living in crime and poverty). 
 335. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 686.  For a powerful analysis of the effect of 
crime control on impoverished communities, see CLEAR, supra note 101, at 5. 
 336. MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 106 
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insecure relationships resulting from harsh living conditions and high 
imprisonment levels mean that many community members can readily gain 
access to information about their neighbors.337  This state of affairs makes 
large numbers of inner-city males subject to pressures to snitch, yet, as 
Natapoff notes, if anywhere near eight percent of the male neighborhood 
population is snitching, that percentage will approach the level of East 
Germans living under Communism who informed the Stasi, the secret 
police.338  Natapoff is not, of course, comparing American police to the 
Stasi, but she is pointing out the sort of distrust that such wide-spreading 
snitching fosters.339  As one East German citizen of the time put it, “These 
informers determined my life, changed my life over those ten years.  In one 
way or another—because they poisoned us with mistrust.  They caused 
damage simply because I suspected there could be informants in my 
vicinity.”340  An East German citizen need not be guilty of any wrong to be 
plagued by mistrust, for informants might lie, misunderstand, mislead, or 
confuse the words and actions of the innocent.341  Alternatively, an innocent 
person might fear his words being used against his admittedly guilty loved 
ones.342  One East German intellectual again put the point well: 
In the defeated system, we lived in deformed interpersonal relationships 
and conditions.  We did not act freely in casual encounters with others—
like with the neighbours.  We automatically blocked our reactions, we 
turned away as soon as a look seemed too curious to us, a question too 
probing, an interest in us not sufficiently justified.  We lived in many 
respects like oysters.343 
The American snitch culture, worries Natapoff, is creating inner-city 
versions of human oysters as well: closed and isolated, protecting 
themselves with a hard shell shielding each person from open interaction 
with others.344  Already vulnerable people find their life difficulties 
exacerbated, being treated less like humans than shellfish.345  This distrust, 
of course, infects not only the innocent but the guilty too.  Fear makes them 
jumpy and proactive, especially encouraging gang members to use more 
 
(1995); see MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 133-36 (1999) (making similar point). 
 337. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 686-87. 
 338. See id. at 692. 
 339. See id. at 691-92. 
 340. BARBRA MILLER, NARRATIVES OF GUILT AND COMPLIANCE IN UNIFIED GERMANY: 
STASI INFORMERS AND THEIR IMPACT ON SOCIETY 101 (1999) (quoting Irena Kukutz). 
 341. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 691-92. 
 342. See id. 
 343. MILLER, supra note 340, at 127 (quoting Gunter Kunert). 
 344. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 692. 
 345. See id. at 691-92. 
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and harsher violence, including preemptive violence, “to prevent snitching 
and punish informants.”346  Again, it is the innocent who suffer from this 
heightened violence and fear. 
2. Procedural Justice Effects 
a. Undermining Law Enforcement Legitimacy 
Apart from potentially increasing crime and undermining social 
relationships, the forces just described also undermine law enforcement 
legitimacy.347  Community members see the guilty (the informers) go 
unpunished for past crimes, while their future crimes are seemingly 
encouraged by the police.348  Moreover, the police seem simply to be 
favoring some illegal “business” interests over others, putting some 
criminals out of business while allowing other equally guilty ones to 
thrive.349  Nor do community members feel protected by the police, indeed 
sensing underenforcement of the laws that are needed to preserve 
community safety.350  These are hardly messages of the objective, rational, 
equal treatment that the rule of law promises.351  Moreover, these perceived 
abuses generate community resentment at maltreatment that marks them as 
less worthy than others, and despair as they see their children learn the 
lesson that betrayal has its advantages.352 
 
b. Weakening Adversarial Safeguards and Police Objectivity 
 
Other features of the informant-handling process amplify these 
 
 346. See id. at 689. 
 347. Cf. HARRIS, supra note 45, at 117-28 (explaining how racial profiling undermines the 
legitimacy of law enforcement and of the state more generally). 
 348. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 680-82. 
 349. See id. at 648-49, 681-82, 694. 
 350. See id. at 688-89; Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 
1717-18 (2006) (more generally analyzing the reality and consequences of underenforcement of 
the criminal law in poor inner-city communities). 
 351. Frank I. Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499-1500 (1988) (defining the 
“rule of law”); see JOHN MCGOWAN, AMERICAN LIBERALISM: AN INTERPRETATION FOR OUR 
TIME 19-40 (2007) (explaining the “rule of law” as a means for making law the servant of, rather 
than a tyrant over, the people); RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 149-51 (2001) 
(defending the idea of the rule of law against its critics). 
 352. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 681-83 (informant culture teaches betrayal); 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Condemning the Racist Personality: Why the Critics of Hate Crime Legislation 
Are Wrong, 40 B.C. L. REV. 739, 749-50 (1999). 
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negative procedural justice effects.  For example, police or prosecutor 
agreements with informants are often made entirely in secret, without ever 
even being reduced to writing.353  The usual safeguards involved in guilty 
pleas, such as judicial review and publicity for the deal, are missing,354 and 
the deals themselves may be vague and malleable.355  Nor is defense 
counsel involved, eliminating the safeguards of adversarialism.356 
Law enforcement may also become dependent on the use of informants 
rather than on vigorous, reliable, independent investigation.357  Indeed, 
informers and handlers can work so closely together as to distort handler 
judgment, the phenomenon of “falling in love with your rat.”358  One 
prosecutor explains: 
[Y]ou spend time with this guy, you get to know him and his family.  You 
like him . . . [T]he reality is that the cooperator’s information often 
becomes your mind set . . . It’s a phenomenon and the danger is that 
because you feel all warm and fuzzy about your cooperator, you come to 
believe that you do not have to spend much time or energy investigating 
the case and you don’t.  Once you become chummy with your cooperator, 
there is a real danger that you lose your objectivity.359 
This loss of objectivity can mean that unreliable tips are not adequately 
screened, while encouraging disrespect for law enforcement because the 
public has good reason to suspect such chumminess as to identify law 
enforcement with the criminals they handle.360  Eroding the line between 
the prosecutor as a neutral, independent enforcer of the law and the criminal 
underworld thus taints prosecutors in the public mind.361 
Perhaps even worse, however, is that most informants are handled by 
the police, largely or entirely free of prosecutorial monitoring.362  This 
police dominance and lack of accountability encourages the intentional or 
unintentional fostering of perjury or false reports.363  Thus law Professor 
Ellen Yaroshefsky, based upon her interviews with defense counsel, who 
 
 353. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 665. 
 354. See id. 
 355. See id. at 665-66. 
 356. See id. at 667. 
 357. See, e.g., id. at 671. 
 358. Yaroshefsky, supra note 219, at 944. 
 359. Id. 
 360. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 672. 
 361. See id. 
 362. See id. at 674-75; but see ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecutorial 
Investigations 4, 12-17 (adopted by the ABA House of Delegates February, 2008) (suggesting 
some degree of prosecutorial oversight of police investigations in the pre-arrest or pre-indictment 
investigative phase of a criminal case). 
 363. See id. 
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are among the few actually involved in confidential proffer sessions, writes 
of a “typical scenario” in which a cooperator first denies that a Mr. Jones, 
eagerly sought by the police, was involved in a crime, then suddenly 
remembers Jones’ involvement to placate the agent’s unhappiness with the 
initial denial.364  Such sessions are likely to be much worse in the more 
common cooperation agreement in which counsel is not involved.  
Additionally, the secrecy and informality of the process enhances police 
discretion, a nightmare for neighborhood residents who already distrust the 
police.365  Justice also seems to be for sale, for the way a wrongdoer escapes 
liability is by selling information, and this willingness to sell out another 
determines who tastes freedom and who languishes behind bars.366  This 
commodification of justice “suggests that we live in a government of men, 
not laws.”367 
While logic and general principles of psychology suggest that the 
informant culture undermines perceived procedural justice, thus fostering 
crime while discouraging citizen cooperation with the police in solving 
crime, I know of no significant empirical work directly addressing this 
question.368  But there is one cultural development that can be seen as 
significant evidence of negative procedural justice effects: The “Stop 
Snitching” Movement.369 
c. Stop Snitching as Evidence of Procedural Justice Effects 
This movement began with the distribution of a DVD called Stop 
Fucking Snitching, Vol.1.370  The DVD includes interviews with residents of 
a Baltimore inner-city neighborhood who lamented the presence of snitches 
and threatened them with retribution.371  The video also named some 
cooperators.372  Police and prosecutors immediately condemned the video 
as conveying threats to intimidate witnesses from testifying.373  But the 
DVD’s producer claimed to have a different goal—to revive an older street 
culture in which criminals who get caught do the time for their crime, 
 
 364. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 219, at 959. 
 365. See Natapoff, Snitching, supra note at 329, at 677-78. 
 366. See id. at 651-52, 692. 
 367. Id. at 682. 
 368. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 164-93 (discussing the nature of procedural 
justice). 
 369. See ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS & THE CORRUPTION OF 
JUSTICE 10-11, 16 (2007). 
 370. See id. at 170. 
 371. See id. 
 372. See id. at 171. 
 373. See id. at 171-72, 177. 
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instead of evading moral and penal responsibilities for their actions by 
turning on, perhaps lying about, other persons.374 
Whatever were the true intentions of the producer or the likely impact 
of the video on its audience, the DVD sparked a curious phenomenon.  T-
shirts sporting a stop sign emblazoned with the words “STOP 
SNITCHING” hit the market, selling like hotcakes!375  The video itself sold 
by the thousands, the shortness of supply relative to demand resulting in 
pirated copies being auctioned on eBay for over $100.376  Police worried 
that a massive form of witness intimidation was at work that needed to be 
stopped.377  Fearing just that outcome, some police have created “Start 
Snitching” programs to counter this perceived threat to witnesses’ testifying 
about gang violence.378 
But there is another interpretation of the Stop Snitching movement, 
namely, as a protest against a racially-discriminatory and community-
destroying snitch culture.379  Just as even rap music about violence has 
numerous fans who praise its message of protest but would never dream of 
committing a violent crime,380 so has Stop Snitching captured the 
imagination of youth eager to rail against a system they do not trust.381  
Crime reporter and analyst Ethan Brown agrees, declaring that the 
movement is “propelled not by a reflexive anti-law enforcement mentality 
but a ‘real sense that the federal system is out of whack and that people are 
being put away for the rest of their lives based on [testimony from] 
informants.’”382  Professor Marc Lamont distinguishes between witnesses—
who act out of civic duty—and informants, who seek leniency, money, or 
self-advancement.383  The movement, he maintains, is only about stopping 
the informants, for the civic-minded witnesses to crime are sorely 
 
 374. See id. at 172. 
 375. See BROWN, supra note 369, at 172. 
 376. See id. at 171-72. 
 377. See id. at 172. 
 378. See American Civil Liberties Union, Drug Law Reform Project, Summary of Proceeding 
from a Roundtable Discussion, Undercover, Unreliable and Unaddressed: Reconsidering The Use 
of Informants in Drug Law Enforcement, ACLU Drug Law Reform Project’s Informant 
Roundtable, 7 (Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Roundtable]. 
 379. See BROWN, supra note 369, at 15-17, 177. 
 380. See generally KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, UNDERGROUND CODES: RACE, CRIME, 
AND RELATED FIRES 35-54 (2004); Robert Firester & Kendall T. Jones, Catchin’ the Heat of the 
Beat: First Amendment Analysis of Music Claimed to Incite Violent Behavior, 20 LOY. L.A. ENT. 
L. REV. 1, 18-25 (2000). 
 381. See supra text accompanying note 329. 
 382. See BROWN, supra note 369, at 11. 
 383. See Roundtable, supra note 378, at 8. 
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needed.384  Lamont expands upon this point, also offering comments on 
how to address it, its likely roots, and the real message behind the 
movement: 
In communicating to the public, we need to have a deep and thorough, rich 
and nuanced conversation about what we mean by snitching.  Nobody 
wants to see grandma get knocked on the head and nobody says 
anything—we’re on the same page as far as that goes.  But the discourse 
has become so impoverished that when we talk about snitching, we are 
talking about two different things . . . . 
. . . . 
We’ve divorced the conversation about the police from a conversation 
about the state systematically oppressing people.  Part of our job is to 
engage in political education that includes, in fact begins with, a theory of 
the state.  I’m not talking about some highbrow theory.  I’m talking about, 
“The state does not work.  The law does not have the capacity to yield 
equality to people.”  There are people in our communities who do not 
believe that the law could ever be just and fair and there are others who 
do.  We should start to engage with this conversation about the role of the 
state in criminal informant policy.385 
Hill is clear that part of what he means by inequality in this quote is 
racial inequality.386  Snitches snitch on those they know, and since the 
police disproportionately focus on racial minorities as the pool from which 
to recruit snitches, snitches tend to snitch on other persons who belong to 
similar racial minorities.387  Says Lamont, “The role of snitches on 
everything from the plantation and through the Black Freedom struggle . . . 
is a critical part of public and collective memory.”388  This remembered 
suspicion is stoked when inner-city Blacks see informants corrupting their 
own communities rather than white ones.389  Distrust is stoked further as 
apparently true stories circulate about a mother whose mentally ill son, with 
a previously spotless criminal record, serves time “on the false word of an 
informant”; a 92-year-old woman is killed in a fruitless police SWAT-team 
 
 384. See id.  That such civic-minded witnesses’ cooperation with the police is needed seems 
uncontroversial.  But it is worth reembering that even civic-minded tips can be mistaken and can 
be distorted by subconscious racial bias. 
 385. See id. at 7-8. 
 386. See id. 
 387. See id.; Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 673 (making similar point). 
 388. American Civil Liberties Union Drug Law Reform Project, Appendix A, Speaker 
Summaries, Proceedings from a Roundtable Discussion, Undercover, Unreliable, and 
Unaddressed: Reconsidering the Use of Informants in Drug Law Enforcement, ACLU Drug Law 
Reform Project’s Informant Roundtable, Testimony of Lamont Hill [hereinafter Appendix A]. 
 389. See id. 
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raid of her home, based upon a “tip” later discovered to have been 
fabricated by the police as the sole evidence of her wrongdoing; and another 
mother is temporarily jailed on the false word of an informant whom the 
prosecutor knew to be drug-addicted and mentally unstable.390  The results 
are predictable: innocent citizens in need of protection shutting their mouths 
as much from fear of the police as fear of the thugs.391 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has had two goals: first, to articulate a theoretical model of 
the role that race can play in convicting the innocent; second, to apply that 
model to the illustrative situation of informant abuse.  The general model 
postulated five inter-related raced effects: the selection, blinders, ratchet, 
procedural justice, and bystander effects.  The evidence for these effects 
being at work in the context of informants is admittedly sparse and 
sometimes equivocal.  Nevertheless, the evidence is sufficient to raise cause 
for concern that race does raise the risks in certain communities of arresting 
and convicting the factually innocent while also imposing widespread 
harms on the “morally innocent”—those “innocent” bystanders among us 
who are never arrested but suffer from an abusive error-prone informant 
system just the same.392 
The story of Kathryn Johnston illustrates the plight of the morally 
innocent in a stark way, for the unregulated, secretive nature of the 
informant system allows police sloppiness or outright lies told to support 
their preconceived notions of guilt—notions fostered by an initial weak 
informant’s tip—to magnify the ill raced effects discussed here.393  The 
consequences can be tragic. 
 
 390. See id. 
 391. See id. 
 392. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
 393. See Alexandra Natapoff, Kathryn Johnston Paid Price for Police Reliance on Snitches, 
S.F. CHRON., August 16, 2007, at B7, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/08/16/EDK7RJ2G3.DTL [hereinafter Natapoff, Johnston] (concisely 
summarizing the Johnston case and its legal and social implications); e-mail from Alexandra 
Natapoff, Professor of Law, Loyola Law School  Los Angeles, to Andrew E. Taslitz, Welsh S. 
White Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law (Jan. 24, 
2008, 12:33 PST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Natapoff, e-mail] (discussing Johnston’s race); 
Alexandra Natapoff, Written Testimony For The U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On 
The Judiciary Subcommittee On Crime, Terrorism And Homeland Security, And The 
Subcommittee On The Constitution, Civil Rights And Civil Liberties, Joint Oversight Hearing On 
Law Enforcement Confidential Informant Practices 110th Cong. 1-7 (July 19, 2007) available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/media/pdfs/Natapoff070719.pdf [hereinafter Natapoff, Joint Oversight 
Hearing (detailing the Johnston case facts and their significance for improving systems for 
regulating informants). 
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Johnston was an innocent 92-year-old African-American grandmother 
killed in November 2006 by the police, who rested their fears of her violent 
nature and their suspicions of her criminality on a flawed tip.394  Explains 
informants’ scholar Alexandra Natapoff, 
The police targeted Johnston’s Atlanta home based on a bad tip from a 
suspected drug dealer; they then fabricated an imaginary informant to get 
a warrant; and after Johnston’s death, the police tried to pressure a long-
time snitch, Alex White, to lie and say that he’d bought drugs in the 
elderly woman’s home.395 
The killing of this unarmed elder sparked July 2007 hearings before the 
Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives on law 
enforcement’s confidential informant practices.396  After reviewing the data 
summarized in this article, I find it hard not to suspect that Johnston’s race 
was an important contributing factor  to the officer’s misguided actions, and 
Natapoff agrees.397 
Observations made through this piece counsel further empirical 
research, both as to the general model hypothesized here and as to its 
operation in an informant culture.  But these observations also lend further 
support to the growing set of reforms of the snitch system that have been 
advocated by other commentators.398  If race raises the risk of error about 
who did the crime or whether one even happened, that is all the more reason 
to insist on corroboration as one prerequisite for relying on an informants’ 
tip.399  If secrecy and police domination of the informant process limit 
police and prosecutor accountability, and if the resulting absence of the 
self-correcting measures of wider scrutiny endanger the innocent, then more 
formal processes with court supervision, or at least active prosecutorial 
 
 394. See Natapoff, Johnston, supra note 393. 
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 396. See Natapoff, Joint Oversight Hearing, supra note 393, at 1-7. 
 397. See Natapoff, e-mail, supra note 393. 
 398. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 369, at 223-24; Clifford Zimmerman, Back from the 
Courtroom: Corrective Measures to Address the Role of Informants in Wrongful Convictions, in 
WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 199, 200-04, 210-16 (Saundra D. 
Westerrelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001) (summarizing possible cures for informant abuse, 
including cautionary jury instructions, judicial screening of proposed informants’ testimony for 
reliability, encouraging corroboration of informant testimony before permitting its use, broader 
prosecutorial disclosure obligations, wider discovery, prohibitions on any rewards or benefits for 
informing, placing the burden of justifying informant use on the prosecution, presuming that all 
actions by an informant once an informant-handler relationship exists are state action, severely 
punishing misconduct where it is discovered, and drafting ethical guidelines for law enforcement 
handling of informants). 
 399. See Zimmerman, supra note 398, at 204 (discussing corroboration). 
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monitoring, should be required.400  I see no point in recounting here the 
many sorts of wise reforms counseled by others, which often recognize that 
some use of informants is sometimes necessary.401  But that use must be 
channeled, controlled, filtered, and limited, and the likely racially biasing 
effects of the current system offer new and perhaps stronger reason for 
change.  Moreover, most of the literature has cautioned against using many 
sorts of informants as trial witnesses.402  But I have tried to argue here that 
even confidential or anonymous informants pose dangers of racial bias and 
error.  The need for reform thus reaches a much wider universe than most of 
the innocence literature has recognized, and the need for reform is urgent.  
Although more empirical research is needed, the risks of harm are 
sufficiently great that reform cannot await further study.  The burden should 
be on those opposed to reform to prove their case for delay (given the 
grievous risks of tardiness)—a burden they simply have not met.  The time 
to act is now. 
 
 
 400. See id. at 201-04, 210-15. 
 401. See id. at 200-04, 210-16; Natapoff, Snitching, supra note 329, at 697-703 
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